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Financial Power & Monetary Regionalism 
Abstract 
The dissertation discusses financial power and monetary regionalism 
against the background of the European Monetary Union. It examines the 
role of financial power in states' decisions to sacrifice their national 
monetary policy in favour of a monetary union. The level of analysis is the 
nation state. 
The post-Bretton Woods financial system and the globalisation of financial 
markets have pronounced the unequal distribution of financial power 
across nation states. The majority of member countries in the eurozone 
with previously little financial power have chosen monetary integration as 
a response to globalisation. On the other hand, countries with substantial 
financial power such as Germany agreed to monetary integration for the 
sake of a mercantilist economic agenda and broader political goals. 
Thus, the central theoretical conflict of regionalism, whether the latter is a 
response to or part of globalisation, can be reconciled. However, tensions 
arise from hegemonic dominance and the different interests of nation 
states in pursuing monetary regionalism. Further research should focus on 
the attainability of symmetric regional integration and identify how 
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1. Introduction 
Regionalism refers to states substituting a regional order for domains of 
national sovereignty and to the political ideology of regionalism. (8oughey 
2003: 39). Monetary regionalism labels regional cooperation in monetary 
and fiscal affairs (Dieter & Higgot 2003: 430-455). 
Regionalism is understood as either a response to or a part of 
globalisation (Hettne 1999: 1). The quality of globalisation and its impact 
on the nation state are disputed (Gilpin 2001: 362-376). However, a 
consensus has emerged that financial markets are the most globalised 
domains of the international economy 1 (Keohane & Nye 2000: 110). 
European monetary integration is considered the most advanced real 
world example of economic integration (EI-Agraa 1997: 2). Hence, 
monetary regionalism and its role within the process of economic 
globalisation deserve special attention. 
The roots of European integration are controversial. Some authors argue 
that European regionalisation is predominantly market-driven (Mattli 1999) 
while others stress the pOlitical nature of the process (Gilpin 2001: 343). 
The paper adheres to an eclectic perspective on European regionalism 
based on state-centric realism. Integration comprises economic and 
political factors (King 1998: 2; EI-Agraa 1997: 5; 12-17; 97-111). However, 
economic aspects of integration gained importance in new regionalism. 
This paper will concentrate on new regionalism and the political economy 
of monetary integration. 
Monetary, fiscal and trade policies are central tools of states' economic 
interventions (Mankiw 2000: 312-348). Currency markets connect national 
economies and affect their sovereignty to pursue favourable economic 
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such as the liberalisation of capital flows and the termination of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system were a political decision (Eatwell & Taylor 
2000: 1). 
Susan Strange coined the term financial power to describe the influence 
on structures that govern the ability to pursue beneficial monetary policies 
(Strange 1988: 90-118). The dissertation argues that financial power is a 
key to stimulating economic growth. Instead of simply eroding financial 
power globalisation has distributed it unevenly among states and regions. 
The dissertation examines how monetary regionalism relates to financial 
power. It will focus on monetary issues and omit fiscal and trade policy 
from the analysis. 
Monetary policy is conducted by central banks. The institutional mandate 
of central banks and their democratic accountability differ across countries 
and regions. Central banks have often pursued their own agenda against 
the will of national governments (Trichet 2007). Further, domestic factors 
such as the social contract determining wage bargaining relations have an 
impact on monetary sovereignty (Moore 2006a: 4; see chapter 3.1). 
However, the central bank's mandate, the social contract and international 
monetary cooperation itself are political decisions. Within the European 
Union (EU) despite its high degree of central bank independence the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the EU (ECOFIN) has the right 
to determine exchange rate policy (European Union 2006). Hence, it is 
sensible to assume that policy makers take the financial power of their 
domestic monetary institutions into account when making political 
decisions that affect the global distribution of financial power. Therefore, 
the dissertation will treat central banks' financial power as domestic 
financial power regardless of the specific institutional arrangement. 
1 Despite globalisation financial markets are concentrated on a few international regions 
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Consequently, the dissertation seeks to answer the question of why EU 
members sacrificed their national monetary policies in favour of a common 
currency (euro) against the background of financial globalisation. 
The idea of a monetary union in Europe was spelled out formally for the 
first time in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (European Union 2002) and was 
even pursued during the system of Bretton Woods. However, the 
liberalisation of capital markets and the later crisis of Bretton Woods 
boosted the development of European monetary regionalism (see chapter 
6). 
Economic literature explains monetary integration mostly from a regional 
perspective with reference to price stability and reduced transaction costs 
(De Grauwe 1997). However, it fails to provide a rationale for Germany's2 
interest in European monetary integration as the country possessed a 
well-established niche currency (Bofinger & Flassbeck 2000: 1). Further, it 
does not provide convincing arguments as to why countries with trade 
deficits should sacrifice the possibility of competitive devaluation via the 
exchange rate. 
The dissertation argues that regionalism involves different interests within 
and across nation states participating in a monetary union3. The aim is not 
a detailed analysis of the objectives of every single nation state for 
introducing the euro. Instead, the work proposes stylised groups of 
European states with common characteristics and demonstrates that 
countries with comparable financial power choose similar approaches to 
monetary regionalism. 
The research is based on a textual analysis (Fairclough 2003) of monetary 
integration. It utilises a qualitative concept of financial power supported by 
2 The paper will use the term Germany when speaking of the Federal Republic of 
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quantitative data. A significant attribute to distinguish nation states' interest 
in monetary integration is their degree of financial power. Accordingly, 
European monetary regionalism holds two conflicting rationales: a 
response of the majority of European countries to the globalisation of 
financial markets and a framework for the (mercantilist) economic agenda 
of a regional hegemonic country such as Germany. Hence, the competing 
explanations of regionalism being either a response to or part of 
globalisation can be reconciled. 
The term EMU usually refers to the Economic and Monetary Union and 
includes EU member countries that have preserved their national 
currency. The dissertation refers exclusively to the decision of countries to 
abandon national currency. Consequently, the term EMU will be used as a 
synonym for European Monetary Union. 
The decisions of important EU members such as the United Kingdom 
(UK), Sweden or Denmark to abstain from EMU will be considered, albeit 
not in detail. Countries that tie their monetary policy to the euro, such as 
Montenegro, Kosov04 , the Vatican State or the former West African Franc 
Zone are not covered. The latecomers to (monetary) integration Malta, 
Cyprus and Slovakia and specific cases such as Austria (with its former 
policy of non-alliance), Ireland (with strong economic ties to the UK, which 
abstained from EMU), Finland (a country rather atypical of the 
Scandinavian welfare state and a latecomer to integration) and Greece 
(which had no influence on the preliminary stages of EMU and is widely 
ignored in relevant literature) will not be examined for comparative 
reasons. They joined the process of EMU too late to have had a 
meaningful influence on its design and had very specific reasons to pursue 
monetary union. Further, textual evidence for their monetary integration 
policies is hardly accessible. 
3 The nation state is the level of analysis of this dissertation. 
4 The legal status of Kosovo as an independent state or a region belonging to the Serbian 
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The design of the EMU is the result of asymmetric power between the 
member states and may prove unsustainable. However, an analysis of the 
architecture of monetary integration goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Liberalisation and globalisation of financial markets have 
created volatile economic conditions. But sudden shifts within the financial 
structure are rare examples in history. The current global economic crisis 
may, however, become such an occasion. The collapse of the credit 
system emanates from the leading financial centres of the capitalist 
economies and might provoke the deepest economic (and political) crisis 
since World War II. The dissertation can not address the unforeseeable 
outcomes of the current crisis. Anyhow, the international role of the euro is 
likely to be affected. 
European monetary regionalism reveals some interesting policy options 
for global regions with little financial power. The current self-help regime in 
international financial relations puts marginalised economies under 
recurrent stress. Therefore, monetary regionalism will remain influential as 
a political concept depending on the success of the European model to 
cope with global economic crisis and internal conflicts. 
Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into a theoretical section and a case study. The 
conceptual framework is outlined from the second to the fourth chapter. 
The case study comprises chapters 5 to 7. 
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical perspective on European regionalism. 
Chapter 3 explains the concept of financial power and its relevance for 
economic policy. Chapter 4 summarises the preliminary conclusions. 
Chapter 5 illustrates the rise and demise of the Bretton Woods financial 
system, and early monetary regionalism in Europe. Chapter 6 reflects the 
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national attitudes towards EMU. Chapter 7 draws final conclusions and 
answers the research question. 
2. The dynamics of European integration 
Two central disputes dominate the discourse on regionalism: whether 
regionalisation is policy- or rather market-driven (Haggard & Fishlow 1992: 
12) and whether integration is a response to or part of globalisation 
(Hettne 1999: 1-3). The chapter develops a theoretical perspective on 
these controversies. 
Chapter 2.1 introduces a theoretical perspective on regional integration5. 
Chapter 2.2 portrays early European integration while excluding a detailed 
portray of EMU to be discussed in the case studl. Chapter 2.3 proposes 
patterns of national integration policies partially based on the historical 
section. European monetary integration or late regionalism would have 
been impossible without early integration. National policies towards 
monetary integration are better understood on the basis of these patterns. 
Chapter 2.4 finally discusses the relationship between European 
integration and economic globalisation. 
2.1. Theories of regional integration 
New regionalism accelerated in the mid 1980s and after the end of Cold 
War. The second wave of regionalisation was much broader than older 
regional movements in the 1950s and 1960s that were largely confined to 
security issues and trade integration. New regionalism includes the closer 
integration of economic, political, social and cultural domains with an 
emphasis on economic harmonisation (80ughey 2003: 46). New economic 
regionalism goes beyond free trade agreements and comprises custom 
unions in areas such as finance and cross border investment (Gilpin 2001: 
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341). The central innovation of new European regionalism was mutual 
recognition of national standards, increasing competitive pressures on 
higher regulated economies (Scharpf 1996: 15-40). 
The literature has developed a hierarchy of (economic) regionalism: The 
initial stage is a Free Trade Area (FTA) followed by a customs union with a 
common external tariff. The customs union enables a common market 
including the free movement of factors of production (goods, services, 
people, capital). The economic union harmonises monetary and fiscal 
poliCies. A political union ideally complements economic integration (EI-
Agraa 1997: 2; Viner 1950). 
2.1.1 Economic Theories of Integration 
Nation building and integration of territories into larger units are no modern 
phenomena. Charles Tilly analysed European nation building as a process 
where the monopolisation of warfare eliminates smaller and inefficient 
units of power (Tilly 1985: 167-191). However, prior to the post-World War 
II era economists had written little about the subject of regional integration 
(Gilpin 2001: 344-345). 
European economic integration stimulated the research interest of 
economists. The most important theoretical contributions are: new 
institutionalism, new political economy, Jacob Viner's research on custom 
unions, Marxist approaches, the theory of an optimum currency area 
(OCA) and new trade and growth theories (Gilpin 2001: 345-348). 
New institutionalism explains regionalism with the desire to eliminate 
market failures and solve coordination problems. New political economy 
focuses on interest groups and redistributive effects of regional integration 
such as privileging members within the region versus outsiders. 
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Consequently, economic integration can be explained as the efforts of 
domestic interest groups to redistribute national income in their own 
favour. (Gilpin 2001: 345). 
Jacob Viner has sponsored a similar approach. He argued that custom 
unions with a common external tariff boosted trade within the regional 
framework and diverted trade outside the region. Viner influenced a lasting 
controversy among economists about whether regionalism has positive or 
negative welfare effects on the world economy? For Viner this remained 
an empirical question, since trade-diverting effects could be compensated 
by welfare gains inside the region. These gains could possibly benefit the 
world economy via lower costs of production (Viner 1950; Gilpin 2001: 
347) 
The Marxist approach to regionalism stresses the desire of transnational 
capital to enhance its competitiveness by increaSing its scale of capital 
accumulation (Mandel 1970). 
The theory of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA) tried instead to establish 
criteria that make exchange rates between national economies 
superfluous. According to that theory external shocks to an economy may 
be absorbed without exchange rates under the condition that prices and 
wages or factors of production (capital and labour) are perfectly mobile 
within a currency area (Mundell 1962). 
New trade and new growth theories modified neoclassical assumptions 
about perfect competition and diminishing returns to scale. Hence, 
economic integration might imply increaSing economies of scale and 
technological spill-over within the region that improve the bargaining 
position of their local firms and governments (Gilpin 2001: 348). 
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Jan Tinbergen distinguished policy-driven from market-based regionalism. 
He labelled the former positive integration and the latter negative 
integration (Tinbergen 1965). In example, the removal of barriers (e.g. to 
trade) would be understood as negative integration whereas supranational 
governance implies positive integration (Tinbergen 1965). 
2.1.2 Political Theories of Integration 
Political theories of regionalisation focus on institutional solutions to 
anarchy and the security dilemma. The most influential theories are 
federalism, (neo-)functionalism, neo-institutionalism, intergovernmentalism 
and state-centric realism (Gilpin 2001: 348-349). 
Federalism features idealist attempts to overcome the problem of war. It 
supports federal institutions to take over political autonomy and 
sovereignty. Federalism emphasises persuasion, winning over public 
opinion and institution-building. Federalist thought inspired the League of 
Nations (Gilpin 2001: 349). 
Pre-World War " functionalism was a response to the failure of the 
federalist approach, which governed the League of Nations. The leading 
functionalist thinker, David Mitrany, argued that economic and 
technological developments enabled and required global integration. 
Mitrany argued for international cooperation in areas such as health, 
postal services and telecommunication. He believed that individual states 
could not deal effectively with complex technical problems, which in turn 
require international organisations. Mitrany hoped that social and 
economic welfare gains would enhance further cooperation and finally 
abolish the nation-state (Gilpin 2001: 349-351; Mitrany 1975). 
In the 1950s Ernst Haas developed an influential neo-functionalist theory 
in the tradition of Mitrany and applied it to European integration (Haas 
2004). He adjusted Mitrany's approach, arguing that domestic interest 
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management of the economy. Integration spills over into new domains and 
broadens the scope of regionalism. Finally, these developments produce a 
regional identity among political elites (Gilpin 2001: 349-352). Neo-
functionalism differs from functionalism. It explains regionalism with 
economic factors instead of deliberate political decisions (Gilpin 2001: 
352-353). 
Robert Keohane applied neo-institutional approaches to international 
politics. Similar to economic neo-institutionalism, his work dealt with 
market failures and transaction costs. Political neo-institutionalism focuses 
on the promotion of political cooperation by mutual recognition of 
standards (Keohane & Hoffmann 1991; Gilpin 2001: 353). 
Domestic politics is a school of thought developed along the lines of 
economic theory. It supplements theories of regionalism that deal with 
international aspects of integration. The literature focuses on distributive 
consequences of integration, domestic institutions and incentives for 
domestic political elites to pursue regionalisation (Gilpin 2001: 354). 
Intergovernmentalism is an influential political theory of regionalism. It 
focuses on solving problems of economic interdependence between 
national economies. Andrew Moravcsik argues that European integration 
primarily reflects three factors: "patterns of commercial advantage, the 
relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentive to 
enhance the credibility of interstate commitments" (Moravcsik 1998: 3). He 
argues that European integration reflects private economic interests and 
short-term macroeconomic preferences (Gilpin 2001: 355). 
Realist theories of integration emphasise the role of power, national 
political interests and interstate conflict. They see political integration 
predominantly as a political decision by nation states in order to achieve 
domestic political and economic objectives. Robert Gilpin, who champions 
state-centric realism, argues that successful integration depends on the 
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2.1.3 An eclectic approach to regional integration 
The following discussion highlights two main deficits of economic theories 
of integration: Firstly, political forces of integration such as the security 
dilemma are not adequately addressed. Secondly, economic theories fail 
to explain persisting differences in the scope of integration across similar 
developed regions such as Europe and North America. An economic 
rationale of integration can not sufficiently explain the different scopes of 
regionalism. 
Economic forces alone, such as comparative advantage of trade, do not 
create reliable integration dynamics. FTAs without perspective for a 
custom union or a common market such as the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) have been a cui de sac of integration8. FTAs exert pressures on 
less competitive or more protectionist members as different external tariffs 
for non-FTA members can provide incentives for tariff arbitrage. Hence, 
FTAs merely reproduce unequal patterns of economic integration (Hettne 
1999: 8). Most world regions have failed to attain deeper regional 
integration beyond FT As. 
Further, regionalism has been a process with many setbacks (e.g. 
between the first and second wave of regionalisation) and no automatism. 
Hence, it should be associated with a unique historical environment: The 
first wave of regionalism reflected the US-dominated framework for post-
World War II reconstruction in the countries belonging to the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Hettne 1999: 5). 
The second wave has been a reaction to the post-Bretton Woods order 
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Gilpin argues that new institutionalism, Marxist theories and new trade and 
growth theories have added insight into the process of regionalisation but 
they commonly neglected political factors such as security imperatives 
(Gilpin 2001: 345; 348). Economic approaches have highlighted domestic 
interest in economic integration. However, they have not sufficiently 
explained why domestic agents with a preference for regionalism have 
been successful in lobbying for their interests. Viner's theory did not 
provide general explanations for economic integration, since benefits differ 
across regions and their specific modes of integration (e.g. FTAs without 
external tariffs vs. custom unions) (Gilpin 2001: 348). 
In sum, an exclusively economic approach to integration is misleading, 
since political initiatives have preceded closer economic integration. 
However, economic theories have explained specific aspects of 
regionalism 
Many political theories of integration were inspired by economic 
approaches and hence fail to provide a comprehensive explanation of 
integration. They often remain at a rather descriptive level. However, they 
have been better in their consideration of the political dimensions (i.e. the 
security problem) that conditioned any deeper integration efforts. 
Gilpin argues that federalism has only been successful under very specific 
circumstances. Federalist states such as the United States of America 
(US) and Switzerland were a response to external security threats. 
Federalist economic integration has been mostly the consequence of 
military conquest of a particular region or a dynastic union (Gilpin 2001: 
349). 
8 The general efficiency of free trade is disputed among economists (Krugman 1987: 131-
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Functionalist and neo-functionalist theories focus on spill-over of 
integration and hence pay little attention to a specific political environment 
supportive of regionalism. They fail to explain different levels of integration 
across regions, temporary setbacks such as those between the first and 
second wave of regionalism and the causes for an initial integration effort. 
However, on a descriptive level functionalism grasps some features of 
integration (e.g. overcoming the state-centric prisoner's dilemma by 
security cooperation). 
Neo-institutionalism explains successful cooperation, stressing reciprOCity 
as a driving force of integration. But it also cannot explain the initial 
impetus for integration (e.g. the role of a hegemon) and has not been 
developed into a coherent theory (Gilpin 2001: 353). 
Domestic politics highlights why some domestic interest groups may prefer 
regional integration. Anyhow, it does provide little insight into why these 
interest groups succeed over those that are sceptical of integration (Gilpin 
2001: 354). 
Inter-governmental theories successfully explain late integration by 
analysing reactions to economic interdependence and the role of domestic 
interests. However, they ignore specific political conditions that enabled 
deeper economic integration (such as security imperatives). Further, they 
lack a coherent approach to why European integration remains unique 
across comparable international regions (Gilpin 2001: 355). 
The present dissertation adheres to state-centric realism and its 
perspective on the rival nature of international relations. Specific groups 
such as organised business frequently share common interests across 
nation states (i.e. preferring protectionist measures against other world 
regions) but compete within a region. Even transnational corporations 
usually develop under a national umbrella and rely on the political 
resources of nation states (Gilpin 2001: 278-304). Regional political 
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and "emancipate" themselves if they obtain relevant resources or 
competencies. Nonetheless, even European governance depends on 
nation states' consent, since the European Union has neither the budget 
nor the democratic legitimacy that powerful European nation states enjoy. 
Hence, a supranational agenda might be the offspring, not the source of 
regionalism. The present dissertation refrains from extensive elaboration 
on the domestic forces that determine national interest as the unit of 
analYSis is the state. Consequently, the analysis of states' integration 
policies should be supplemented by a discussion of domestic politics. 
However, nation-states continue to exercise the monopoly of power and 
hence domestic interest groups do operate within the state-centric 
framework. 
2.2. Early European integration 
Most efforts to achieve economic and political integration in Europe have 
been confined to the period after 1945. However, the idea of European 
unity has a long tradition9. It has been influenced by considerations of 
peace and stability among rival European monarchies and statehoods. 
The first institutionalised approach towards European integration after 
World War" stipulated a perspective for peace and reconstruction across 
the whole continent. The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) was set 
up in 1947 in Geneva as a sub-organisation of the United Nations (UN). 
However, the Cold War immediately doomed any further prospects of pan-
European integration and deepened the divisions along the geographical 
and political lines of the Cold War. 
9 The call for a united Christendom originates in the fourteenth century and the proposal 
for a European Army in the seventeenth century (EI-Agraa 1997: 99). In the nineteenth 
century proposals for a European federation reflected fears of conflicts between 
consolidated and potent European powers. Finally, after World War I the French Foreign 
Minister, Aristide Briand, backed by his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, 
proposed a European Union within the framework of the League of Nations or the United 
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The United States (US) set the condition that aid (Marshall Plan) to the 
war-torn European countries was to be administered within a 
supranational framework. As the Soviets feared Western influence on its 
satellite states, US aid has been processed through the Committee for 
European Economic Cooperation (CEEC). The CEEC later led to the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The ECE had 
no significant impact on European integration (EI-Agraa 1997: 101; 103). 
The main pillars of Western European integration were the European 
Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) while 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) dominated 
Eastern European integration efforts (EI-Agraa 1997: 101). 
COMECON was founded in 1949. The early attempts of countries such as 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to advance regional cooperation (e.g. the Balkan 
Union) were denounced by the Soviets under Joseph Stalin (Jones 1996: 
9). COMECON was largely meaningless until Nikita Khrushchev tried to 
revive cohesion within the Soviet bloc in the late 1950s. The Soviets 
insisted that COMECON was not a supranational organisation in order to 
limit fears of Soviet domination (Jones 1996: 9-10). 
The central objective of COMECON was the promotion of interstate trade 
based on the socialist division of labour. In the absence of a convertible 
currency most inter-state trade was based on barter agreements. 
COMECON had no lasting impact on European regionalism (Jones 1996: 
9-10). 
Western European integration 
In 1948 the UK, France and the Benelux countries launched the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation (BTO), the precedent of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), as a system for mutual assistance against attacks 
by the USSR. In the same year the OEEC emerged and was followed in 
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The OEEC and the Council of Europe deepened the division of Western 
Europe into two camps, which are still meaningful today: One camp 
comprised the UK and, among others, the Scandinavian countries. They 
later formed EFTA. The other camp incorporated six continental states, 
namely the Benelux countries, France, West Germany and Italy, which 
were to establish the EC. The UK had a more sceptical attitude towards 
closer integration as economic devastation caused by World War II was 
more severe in Continental Europe (EI-Agraa 1997: 102-103). The UK 
considered itself a major global power whose foreign policy had been tied 
to the Commonwealth and a special relationship with the United States 
(EI-Agraa 1997: 102). 
The division of the two camps became finally institutionalised when the six 
continental countries created a European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951 (based on the French Schuman Plan). The Montan Union 
was designed to revive the German economy while securing peace. The 
German economy relied heavily on iron, steel and coal, vital raw materials 
of warfare. A common market for these products would remove 
impediments on trade, securing equal access to them for all parties 
irrespective of location and nationality (EI-Agraa 1997: 104-105). The 
ECSC addressed a crucial concern between France and Germany 
regarding security and sovereignty. The integration of West Germany into 
the ECSC enabled France to hand back the Saar region, a region rich in 
war-making resources (EI-Agraa 1997: 105). 
The rearmament of West Germany subsequently became a sensitive 
issue. The United States of America (US), preoccupied with the war in 
Korea, pressured European governments to improve capacities for 
defence against the USSR and raised the issue of a military contribution 
by Germany. The French government proposed a European Army with 
German participation. The proposal implied a huge loss of national 
sovereignty over foreign policy and consequently led to a draft for a 
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the French plan for a common defence policy failed to win the approval of 
the French Assembly. The political forces in France were either opposed 
to rearming Germany or to exposing the French army to supranational 
control. A Franco-German defence policy was also tackled by Britain's 
abstention from the EPC (EI-Agraa 1997: 107). 
The setback to pan-European integration helped Britain succeed with its 
proposal for rearming Germany and subsequently integrating it into the 
NATO. The Eastern European countries reacted to the NATO with the 
Warsaw Pact (EI-Agraa 1997: 108). 
A new stimulus for integration emerged in 1955 from an initiative of the 
Benelux countries for deeper economic integration. The Benelux countries 
proposed a common market or a European Economic Community (EEC) 
and an atomic energy pool. Whilst the UK favoured a free trade area 
under the umbrella of the OEEC, the members of ECSC opted for a fully 
fledged customs union including the abolishment of non-tariff barriers. 
However, the concerns differed within the group of six: France viewed a 
common market critically but welcomed an atomic energy community. The 
other five members had opposite preferences. (EI-Agraa 1997: 108-109). 
Finally, a consensus emerged that gave birth to the EEC while tolerating 
non-tariff barriers (Polster 2002: 250) 
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 launched the economic community and 
Euratom. Finally, the "group of six" belonged to three different entities 
(ECSC, EEC and Euratom) with their own distinct institutions (High 
Authority of ECSC and Commission of EEC and Euratom). A merger 
treaty in 1965 enabled the institutions to become branches of a single 
European superstructure: the European Community (EC) with the 
Commission as executive and co-legislative organ (EI-Agraa: 1997: 110-
111). In 1962 the EC had also established a common agricultural policy 
with the aim of increasing agricultural productivity and devoting more 
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depended on food imports. Further, different national agricultural policies 
were considered harmful to a common market (European Union 2007). 
In 1969 a summit meeting of national political leaders in The Hague 
recognised mutual interdependence. The summit declared to strengthen 
the budgetary position of the EC, embark on an economic and monetary 
union and to face enlargement. However, the coordination of national 
foreign policy remained a delicate question (EI-Agraa 1997: 112). In 1973 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EC. In 1974 the EC was 
complemented by the inter-governmental European Council (EI-Agraa 
1997: 112). 
By the 1980s the EC found itself in a deep crisis over institutional 
progress, foreign and economic policy: Different responses to the Warsaw 
Pact, the NATO, US presence in Europe and a pan-European defence 
policy prevailed (EI-Agraa 1997: 114). A global recession, mass 
unemployment and the shift of leading industrial countries towards 
monetarist policies in the aftermath of the oil crisis defined the economic 
environment. Southern Mediterranean enlargement (Greece, Portugal & 
Spain) put internal economic cohesion under stress and required huge 
transfers of structural funds for those less developed countries. As the 
European Monetary System complicated macroeconomic responses to 
unemployment, the EC shifted its focus onto microeconomic adjustments 
such as liberalising labour markets and increasing international 
competitiveness (EI-Agraa 1997: 114, see chapter 6.1.2). 
A new round of regional integration took off in 1987 with the Single Market 
Act (SEA). The SEA aimed at finalising a true internal market based on the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour by the end of 1992. 
Its primary means to achieve these goals was mutual recognition of 
national standards, putting downward pressures on more regulated 
economies (Scharpf 1996: 15-40). A closer economic relationship with 
EFTA countries, the European Economic Area (EEA), was negotiated. 
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the country. Regime change in Eastern Europe put Eastern enlargement 
on the agenda (EI-Agraa 1997: 115-116). 
The European Council met in this unique historical environment in 
Maastricht in 1991 to produce the decisive Treaty on European Union. It 
entailed a timetable for a full Economic and Monetary Union, brought 
institutional changes and enlarged the scope of European decision-
making (e.g. extending qualified majority voting in the European Council to 
more political areas). Finally, it brought the current structure of the EU, 
which rests on three pillars: Firstly, the fully supranational European 
Communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) or the common market, 
secondly, the common foreign and security policy and thirdly, cooperation 
in the field of justice and home affairs. The second and the third pillar 
remain largely embedded in inter-governmental decision-making. (EI-
Agraa 1997: 116-117). 
EMU led to the introduction of the Euro as accounting currency in 1999 
and its final inception as physical money in 2002 (European Union 2008). 
The Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001) complemented the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1992). However, efforts to ratify a Treaty establishing 
a European constitution (TEC) were rejected in popular votes in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which re-tabled 
the core of the TEC institutional reforms, subsequently failed to win 
approval from the Irish electorate (European Union 2008). 
The aquis communitaire requires new EU member states to adopt primary 
and secondary European law accumulated in the integration process. It 
has become a powerful tool to ensure free market policies across the EU 
by legal force (often against the concerns of national stakeholders such as 
trade unions). The current EU comprises 27 member countries. Croatia 
and Turkey have formally applied for membership, and Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements are being negotiated with many of the new states 
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Dynamics of European regionalism 
In sum, the motives for early Western European integration were fears of 
another exhausting war, the perception of Soviet aggression and the risks 
of an economic collapse (Jones 1996: 4). 
Robert Brenner argues that the United States administration consciously 
accepted an international economic framework where capital controls, 
fixed exchange rates and trade liberalisation gradually hurt US trade 
interests. The US wanted to secure political influence over Western 
Europe against the USSR and provide US corporations with profitable 
investment opportunities abroad (Brenner 2002: 15). 
Hence, European integration benefited from a unique integration 
environment or hegemonic support (within the region and in the global 
political order). According to Gilpin, the US hegemony in the Western 
hemisphere has enabled European integration while it potentially 
undermines its own global leadership (Gilpin 2001: 10-12). The US 
approach towards European integration might therefore become more 
hostile in the future (Dinan 1994: 62). 
However, early European integration has demonstrated the role of national 
interests in determining the character of the regional framework. The 
subsequent chapter will propose patterns of national integration policy that 
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2.3 National patterns of European integration 
The UK and the Nordic countries (except Finland for security related 
reasons bordering the former USSR) are sceptical of supranational 
integration. Historically, they have rarely been involved in Franco-German-
Russian conflicts and were less affected by the devastation of World War 
II than Continental Europe. Hence, their willingness to sacrifice national 
sovereignty has been less pronounced. They subsequently embarked on 
the respective Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian economic models, two 
opposite poles which both differ from Continental European Rhenish 
Capitalism (Esping-Anderson 1990). They have both developed a rather 
unilateral response to economic and political challenges. The UK's attitude 
towards European integration has been influenced by its former role of 
World Power and its special relationship with the US. 
Continental European integration has been largely driven by France's 
security concerns and its desire to avoid confrontation with the rival 
hegemon Germany. Post-War France has been sceptical of market based 
economic integration such as the EEC (which impaired its own post-World 
War II concept of Planification; the country is also driven by concerns over 
Germany's competitive advantage). However, France opted for multilateral 
security cooperation independent of the NATO 10. France's stance on 
security cooperation reflected its loss of political status in comparison with 
the Anglo-Saxon countries. Hence, the country aspired to utilise European 
resources for its national agenda. Certainly, the parliamentary refusal to 
accept an EPC and a common defence policy demonstrated the limits of 
French regionalism. France usually prefers intergovernmental bargaining 
over federalism (see chapter 6). 
10 Recently, France has announced its intention to normalise its relationship with the 
NATO (Valasek 2008). It remains yet unclear whether this serves to distract US concerns 
over a possible emancipation of European security policy or indicates a shift in the 
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Germany hoped to regain sovereignty in international relations after World 
War II. The terms of the Saar region agreement with France required the 
German participation in the French initiative for an ECSC. Political 
sovereignty was a prerequisite for Germany's subsequent economic 
recovery as the Saar region was rich in vital raw materials. The 
international support for a rearmed Germany demanded integration of the 
country into some type of multilateral defence architecture. The integration 
of West Germany into the NATO has prevailed over a common European 
defence policy. However, the rearmament of Germany depended on the 
agreement of its former European war adversaries, especially its 
neighbouring country France. Hence, Germany's close cooperation with 
France in early European affairs has been instrumental for its own 
consolidation of economic power. Germany's quick economic recovery, 
the sound basis of its war-related industries and its well functioning social 
contract (price stability and centralised wage bargaining) (European 
Commission 2009: 76; see also chapter 3.1.) have assisted its competitive 
free market approach to regional integration. 
The Benelux Countries pursue a federalist approach to integration. The 
initiative for the EEC and Euratom is indicative of the Benelux countries' 
preferences: They posses only limited relative power in foreign policy and 
are geographically located between two regional hegemons (see chapter 
6.1.1 and 6.3). The small internal markets and their geographical setting at 
the heart of Europe contributed to a high preference for openness to trade 
and thus competitiveness. Hence, the Benelux countries favoured 
supranational institutions with democratic checks and balances to the 
bargaining power of the regional hegemons. However, their economic 
concepts of integration differed with respect to their economic and political 
weight. Belgium and Luxembourg often sided with France in monetary 
affairs, whereas the Netherlands supported the German approach to 
monetary integration (see chapter 6.1.1 and 6.3). 
The Southern Mediterranean countries are sceptical of free market 
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on structural funds. However, similar to the Benelux countries, they 
possess marginal political weight in the international arena since their 
respective military and colonial dictatorships have collapsed. Further, they 
have a rather weak social contract (European Commission 2009: 76). 
Therefore, they favoured positive integration in political and economic 
affairs. Italy played an exceptional role. It temporarily sided with Germany 
in its approach to economic integration due to its historical ties with the 
country and bargains over structural funds (see chapter 6.1.1 and 6.3). 
In sum, the history of early European integration has illustrated the vital 
role of national (security) concerns for the dynamics of regionalisation. The 
specific integration environment after World War II was characterised by 
the support of a global hegemon for integration (for political and security 
concerns), the war-related devastation and the inability of the regional 
hegemons to consolidate power against each other 11. Monetary integration 
without security cooperation seems an unlikely event. However, the 
experience of collective vulnerability can facilitate integration (e.g. 
monetary regionalism has become more prominent after the financial crisis 
of the late 1990s, see chapter 3.2.4) 
In the next chapter the relationship between regionalism and economic 
globalisation will be discussed. 
11 Heribert Dieter argues that monetary regionalism in Asia will not prevail until either 
China or Japan has established itself as regional hegemon. Japan demonstrated 
considerable reluctance towards responsible regional monetary and economic leadership 
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2.4. Regionalism and economic globalisation 
Two questions dominate the discourse on regionalisation: Whether 
European integration is a response to or part of globalisation and whether 
it is policy- or market driven. The answer to these questions may help to 
properly understand the logic of monetary regionalism. 
A market-driven logic of integration as argued by Walter Mattli (Mattli 
1999) indicates that regionalism is rather a booster of globalisation, 
whereas a policy-driven approach would be associated with regionalism 
being a shield to globalisation. However, some authors in the liberal 
tradition believe that FTAs undermine global economic integration 
(Bhagwati 1997). 
The liberal or idealist tradition in International Relations understands 
economics as a positive-sum game making integration favourable (Art & 
Jervis 1992: 232-233). A realist or mercantilist perspective is based on the 
rival nature (zero-sum game) of economic relations (Art & Jervis 1992: 
233). 
From a realist perspective market-driven integration as well as policy-
driven integration could both indicate a mercantilist response to economic 
competition. The customs union is a good example of the dialectic nature 
of regional integration. It enabled trade liberalisation within the EU while 
imposing a common external tariff. Hence, the relationship of regionalism 
with globalisation does not depend so much on the driving forces of 
integration but on the specific design of the regional project (i.e. positive or 
negative integration). 
Robert Gilpin sees regionalism predominantly as a response to 
globalisation. However, Gilpin acknowledges that regionalism differs over 
space and time. For Gilpin Western European integration is much more 
policy-driven while Pacific Asian regionalism is rather market-driven (Gilpin 
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regionalisation mutually support and contradict each other (Hettne 1999: 
3). 
The present dissertation adheres to an eclectic approach. The design and 
purpose of regionalism depends on the relative power that certain nation 
states and/or domestic interest groups enjoy. The dissertation identifies 
national policies towards monetary regionalism and their impact on 
European regionalism rather than defining the character of regionalism on 
a purely theoretical basis. 
The dissertation argues that the deadlock of rival powers within 
Continental Europe and the policy of the United States towards its Soviet 
counterpart have promoted Western European regionalisation. While the 
initial impetus has been primarily policy-driven, the later development of 
the European project was rather market driven (Karrass 2006). One of the 
reasons for that shift has been the consolidation of German power and its 
mercantilist economic agenda. 
Chapter 3 will specify the concept of financial power in order to qualify the 
research hypothesis that financial power determines nation states' 
monetary integration policies. 
3. The concept of financial power 
Power is a crucial aspect of everyday living; yet the role of power has 
been widely ignored in economic theory (e.g. in determining market 
outcomes) (Rothschild 1971: 7). Joseph Nye postulated: "Power, like love, 
is easier to experience than to define or measure". (Nye 1990: 177). 
However, commercial power and military power are central to the studies 
in international relations (Art & Jervis 1992; Salaam & Veseth 2000: 25-
42). 
Some authors argue that the character of power has fundamentally 
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behaviour or interests of other political bodies by cultural or ideological 
means has become increasingly relevant in international politics. Soft 
power mainly serves to circumvent the huge costs associated with hard 
power (Nye 2004). Mark Leonard argues that the EU exercises a 
significant degree of soft power by shaping the legal frameworks of 
countries whose governments wish to join the common market (Leonard 
2006: 67-69). 
The dissertation assumes that soft power is neither new nor has it 
substituted hard power. For example, the colonial mission civilisatrice 
combined soft power (religion) with hard power (force) (Paris 2002: 627-
656). James Scott argued that under conditions of (economic) 
dependency people advance their interests (e.g. demanding charity from 
wealthier members of a religious community) within the limits of dominant 
cultural and religious ideologies for pragmatiC reasons (Scott 1985). 
Hence, soft power is often a by-product of tangible economic incentives 
such as the advantages of operating within a common market (Leonard 
2006: 76). Nonetheless, the work of Antonio Gramsci or the concepts of 
political culture have provided strong arguments against mono-causal 
perspectives on power (Adamson 1983; Berman 2001: 231-250). 
Therefore, it is important to identify whether the specific domain being 
analysed may be properly isolated from other factors determining political 
behaviour (e.g. ideology or culture). The dissertation assumes that 
monetary policy and financial power are too relevant for economic interest 
groups to be predominantly explained with ideology. For example, 
ideology alone cannot be the reason why the US with its strong free 
market approach applies pragmatic monetary policies if mainly inspired by 
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Political behaviour does not necessarily reflect rational interests (Johnson 
1997: 170-174). However, some constant national patterns12 of regional 
integration have been observed over large time spans and across 
governments with different ideological roots. Hence, the present 
dissertation works on the premise that national patterns of economic and 
security imperatives determine international relations. 
Susan Strange observed a shift from relational power to structural power 
in the competitive game of the World System. Strange defined relational 
power as "the power of one player to get another player to do something" 
(Salaam & Veseth 2000: 17), whereas "structural power ( ... ) (meant) the 
power to shape and determine the structures of the global political 
economy ( ... )" (Strange 1988: 25). She argued that four sources of 
structural power dominate the international political economy: security, 
knowledge, production and finance (Strange 1988: 29-32). 
Strange understood financial power as the ability to create credit (lend) 
and to "manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is 
denominated, thus affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in 
other currencies" (Strange 1988: 90). 
She argued that the financial structure consists of two inseparable 
aspects: The structures of the political economy through which credit is 
created and the monetary systems which determine the relative values of 
the different moneys. Strange saw the power to create credit shared by 
governments and banks while the power within monetary or exchange rate 
systems depended on the relationship between states and markets 
(Strange 1988: 90). 
12 National patterns do not necessarily reflect a collective experience such as 
hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s as commonly suggested. Similar events across 
different countries did not produce the same responses. These patterns rather reflect one 
possible response among many to a change in the (international) economic structure that 
subsequently becomes institutionalised (Hegemann 2007: 50). These relatively constant 
approaches of the political elites imply the perception of a rational national interest or at 
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Strange considered the US credit supply after World War II to be far more 
relevant to Western economic development than trade liberalisation and 
the Bretton Woods exchange rate system (Strange 1988: 103-104). The 
amount of capital committed to Europe during the Marshall Plan was 
substantially larger than the assistance by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) under the Bretton Woods agreement (Eichengreen 1996: 98). 
Further, intra- European trade linkages after WW II were initially low 
(Polster 2002 109-110). 
However, the domestic capacities to create credit became gradually more 
relevant and were surely conditioned by the exchange rate system (see 
chapter 3.2). The Marshall Plan and the actual design of the Bretton 
Woods financial system both expressed the United States' desire to 
secure political and economic influence over Europe versus the Soviet 
Union (Strange 1988: 103). The role and the mandate of the IMF became 
more sUbstantial when the US realised that the European Payment Union 
(EPU) bore the seeds of a pan-European alternative to the international 
monetary system (Polster 2002: 131). 
Further, the Bretton Woods financial system was more than an exchange 
rate mechanism. It entailed a specific approach to capital flows (capital 
restrictions) relevant for the management of currencies. Hence, it should 
be assumed that both aspects of Strange's illustration of the financial 
order (domestic institutional arrangement and international monetary 
system) 13 had a significant impact on domestic economic policies. 
13 Werner Polster distinguishes between monetary orders and monetary systems. A 
monetary order may be regulated or market-driven, while a monetary system entails a 
contractual arrangement such as the Bretton Woods agreement (Polster 2002: 75-86). 
However, this dissertation will utilise the original terms as far as it refers to other people's 
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Financial Power 
In sum, financial power is the potential to pursue favourable monetary 
policies (low real interest rates) without external disturbance (erratic 
exchange rates). Financial power is a qualitative concept. The dissertation 
argues that different degrees of financial power explain the choice of 
national policies with respect to monetary integration. It proposes 
indicators to measure financial power and examine that claim. The main 
indicators utilised are the status of the currency as international reserve 
currency, a positive trade balance with other EU countries, moderate 
inflation and an insulated internal market (little openness to trade). 
The status as international reserve currency reflects and supports 
investors' willingness to utilise the currency as a store of value and means 
of transaction, thus stabilising its external value and relaxing external 
constraints on monetary policy. A positive trade balance can be associated 
with more financial power, since monetary policy is not bound by high 
relative inflation compared to trading partners, and the country is a net 
creditor towards other nations. Lower inflation broadens the scope for 
expansionary monetary policy and is therefore associated with more 
financial power. A high openness to trade translates into less financial 
power. Open economies are more vulnerable to exchange rate 
movements and more dependent on price stability to maintain a favourable 
trade balance. The strength of the social contract (see chapter 3.1 and 
chapter 6.3) is a relevant indicator of financial power and could be 
generally measured by the degree of collective bargaining centralisation 
(European Commission 2009: 76). However, in some EMU countries such 
as Germany wage erosion has been observed despite a strong corporatist 
tradition and high wage bargaining centralisation. Restrictive fiscal 
policies, labour market and social security reforms have considerably 
weakened the bargaining position of trade unions (Schettkat 2006: 209 -
215). As a result, defining the strength of the social contract has become 
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ignored as a quantitative indicator in the empirical section (see chapter 
6.3). 
The indicators are difficult to separate. For example, low inflation may be 
the consequence of high interest rates. Countries with great financial 
power may forgo their monetary potential for the sake of an economic 
agenda (e.g. "competitiveness"). Hence, actual monetary or interest rate 
policy is no adequate indicator of financial power. Conversely, higher 
inflation may signal financial leadership (e.g. the US absorbing goods and 
services from the rest of the world). However, this is not the case within 
the EMU. Further, an indicator such as the trade balance does not only 
reflect financial power but the overall structure of the economy. Thus, the 
dissertation will mainly rely on theoretical or textual analysis. The 
indicators merely serve to test the consistency of the proposed patterns of 
monetary integration policies. 
The dissertation shares Strange's perspective that states with large 
financial power can pursue desired macroeconomic policies across 
different monetary regimes. Conversely, national monetary institutions with 
little financial power experience larger monetary restraints under certain 
regimes. Today, capital flows nearly equal the currency reserves 
administered by central banks (Polster 2002: 244-245). Consequently, the 
domestic power to create credit is not only shared between governments 
and banks (the domestic institutional framework) but also between states 
and markets (the monetary or exchange rate system). Therefore, the 
dissertation will primarily focus on the second aspect of Susan Strange's 
definition of the global financial order: the international monetary or 
exchange rate system including the regulation of capital flows (Strange 
1988: 90). 
Significant changes in the structures of the international political economy 
such as the termination of the fixed exchange rate system or the EMU are 
very rare occasions in history. The dissertation is concerned with the 
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Bretton Woods order rather than on the power to redesign the whole 
financial structure. However, the recent global economic crisis may imply 
huge changes in the financial order (e.g. with regard to the lead currency 
status of the US dollar). 
Financial power in a regime with no global or multilateral currency 
depends heavily on the status of a national currency as international 
reserve medium. Presently, the US dollar is the international central 
banks' preferred foreign exchange medium and dominates international 
trade in important commodities such as oil ('The disappearing dollar' 2004: 
9). Recently, speculations have emerged over the euro substituting the 
dollar as leading reserve currency 14. 
The dissertation argues that, although Europe might aspire to financial 
leadership as a consequence of monetary integration, the initial stimulus 
for monetary regionalism is best explained with national agendas. National 
commercial patterns (e.g. the German mercantilist agenda) are a serious 
obstacle to Europe's provision of international liquidity 15. However, 
financial leadership requires a central bank's willingness to act as 
international lender of last resort (Gilpin 2001: 256). The ECB with its tight 
monetary approach has so far been reluctant to accept that responsibility 
(Issing 2007: 31). Global financial leadership also correlates with political 
leadership (Magdoff & Sweezy 1987: 163-175). However, the EU has so 
far made little progress in establishing itself as a coherent political entity in 
areas such as defence and security. 
14 The euro is the second lead currency. Roughly 26 per cent of global currency reserves 
are held in euros. The national currencies within the euro area had occupied only 18 per 
cent of foreign reserves prior to the currency union. The role of the euro in international 
trade and in foreign exchange transactions is constantly expanding (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2008). 
15 Interestingly, the same reluctance towards financial leadership can be observed with 
respect to Japan's role in Asian monetary regionalism (Dieter 2008: 25). Germany and 
Japan are comparable countries since both have adopted policies that kept growth and 
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In order to qualify the argument that credit (the first aspect of Susan 
Strange's definition of financial power) enhances growth, the next chapter 
will provide a brief overview over the role of money in economic theory. 
3.1. Financial power: The role of credit 
Economic theory has identified investment as the primary source of 
technological progress and thus of growth. The major division in economic 
theory is the role of money for investment16: 
The classical or political economists observed the emergence of European 
capitalism and conceptualised a barter economy. The available pool of 
capital for investment restricts the growth of a barter economy. The role of 
money is limited to being a store of value and facilitating the exchange of 
goods and services H As the level of productivity in agriculture is low, the 
population consumes most of the output and few resources are left for 
investment. Workers' salaries have to be kept at the subsistence level in 
order to reserve any surplus for additional investment (capital restriction) 
(Lowe 1975: 415-425). Therefore, the appropriation of surplus labour from 
workers is a precondition to finance investment (Reismann 1985: 4). In 
other words, saving is non-volitional and determines investment. 
16 The term investment refers to both productivity- and capacity-enhancing investment. 
More recent versions of (neoclassical) economic growth theory have introduced concepts 
such as "human capital" to explain (exogenous) technological progress (Wurm 2006). 
However, in that instance investment (e.g. investment in education) continues to explain 
W°wth . 
A notable exception among classical economists is Karl Marx, who acknowledged the 
role of money advances when referring to the realisation problem and the circuit of 
capital. Money allowed investment and additional production to exceed consumption, 
assuming that capitalists undertake investment in order to generate profit or accumulate 
wealth. Unfortunately, the discourse on Marxian economics has mainly centred on the 
labour theory of value and the tendency towards a diminishing rate of profit that involves 
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In neoclassical economics the available pool of capital likewise restricts 
growth. However, as workers' or private households' incomes are not 
necessarily kept at the subsistence level, they may save income. 
Therefore, the available pool of capital depends upon the "volitional 
decisions of economic units to save their money and abstain from 
consuming" (Moore 2006a: 2). If more (less) investment is desired than 
savings available, interest rates will rise (fall) and induce more (less) 
savings and less (more) investment. The money market transfers savings 
to investors, and interest rates are endogenously determined by supply 
and demand of money (Fisher 1930). Hence, in neoclassical economics 
money remains a store of value and a means of transaction with no 
implication for growth. The growth rate is exogenously given by the 
combination of factors of production and exogenous technological 
progress (Solow 1956: 65-94). 
In the monetarist version of neoclassical economics any additional supply 
of money (credit) beyond the growth rate of the economy will simply cause 
prices to rise (inflation). The demand for money is a function of income. 
Free movements of capital and freely floating exchange rates will 
compensate inflation and interest rate differentials (Krugman & Obstfeldt 
2003: 341-350). Thus, the domestic monetary institutions are the culprits 
of inflation. Consequently, the growth of money supply should be firmly 
controlled by central banks according to a fixed rule (Friedman 1969). 
(Post-)Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics differentiates between 
the (historical) development of barter economies, where growth is 
restricted by capital, and modern monetary economies. A modern mone-
tary economy is primarily restricted by the effective demand for goods and 
services. and insecure expectations 18 (Moore 1988; Messori 2002). 
Hence, in monetary economies investment does not depend on savings 
18 The concept of insecure expectations must be separated from the neoclassical 
concept of probability and risk. The latter allows the prediction of certain market 
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but, instead, savings are the accounting record of investment (Moore 
2006a: 2-3). To illustrate the argument: In a stationary economy, where all 
the available output is consumed, additional savings can only occur if 
investment raises income. Money or credit finances these investments 
(Bertocco 2007: 101-122). 
In modern credit economies half of the finance for investment spending is 
provided by corporate retained earnings while the other half is primarily 
raised by bank borrowing (Moore 2006a: 2). Loans or bank borrowing 
results in newly created deposits (money). In practice the central bank 
supplies any reserves demanded by banks to support this level of deposits 
at a given interest rate. The (short-term) interest rate is exogenously 
determined by the central bank (Moore 2006b: 208-214). As a 
consequence in Keynesian theory, savings or the available pool of capital 
are not a restraint on investment (growth) and "most saving is no longer 
volitional" (Moore 2006a: 2). 
Money is not neutral and constitutes a decisive source of investment and, 
hence, income which in turn impacts on consumer spending. Further, 
central banks have no direct influence over the money supply as economic 
agents' demand for money is determined endogenously (with respect to 
their expectations of future income). Hence, additional creation of money 
must not result in inflation if an economy is operating below its capacity 
level. Certainly, "too much money chasing to few goods" might cause 
inflation if the economy has reached its temporary capacity level. 
However, additional money could also create additional productive 
capacity. Therefore, in economies operating below their capacity level 
inflation is explained with the development of unit labour costs. External 
factors for inflation are changes in the relative values of money (exchange 
rates) and the prices of important input factors (i.e. oil). (Moore 1988). 
Lately, a new consensus (neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis) has 
emerged. It stipulates that money is relevant in the short run (as prices are 
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prevails as an expansionist central bank loses credibility with rational 
economic agents and the production capacity is fixed. Wages and prices 
will adjust and neutralise the expansionary effects of monetary policy 
(money illusion). Thus, monetary policy is at best an option to restore full 
employment within the given production capacity (Moore 2006b: 247-252). 
3.1.1 The role of credit in the real world 
The dispute about the role of money for economic development is a 
chicken-egg problem. Empirical studies validate both assumptions: a 
correlation between Inflation and unit labour costs (economic indicator) as 
well as increasing money supply during periods of accelerating inflation 
(monetary indicator) (Moore 1988). However, central banks' attempts to 
directly influence the money supply have proved unsuccessful. The huge 
swings and upward trend in the prime lending rate set by institutions such 
as the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) during its monetarist period 
indicate an endogenous money demand and have led to a public reversal 
of money supply targeting among most central banks (Moore 2006b: 233-
234). Therefore, increasing money supply seems rather the by-product of 
inflation than vice versa 19. 
The Deutsche Bundesbank was one of the few central banks that 
(officially) adhered to pure monetary targeting. It had a great influence on 
the monetary strategy of the ECB, which, however, is based on two pillars: 
the analyses of economic and monetary indicators (European Central 
Bank 2008). The two pillars were primarily a political compromise and a 
signal to the financial markets that the euro would become a safe store of 
value for financial investors (see chapter 6). In practice, the Bundesbank 
19 Price hikes of crude materials and energy accelerated inflation prior to the recent 
economic crisis. However, they can be clearly attributed to speculative patterns. Neither 
patterns of supply and demand nor lending activity by central banks explain these price 
movements since core inflation remained low (Schulmeister 2008). A tighter monetary 
policy would have been likely to induce more financial speculation due to higher interest 
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3.1.2 The monetary policy tools of central banks 
Central banks regulate monetary policy with Open Market Operations 
(OM Os) through purchase and sale of government bonds. If a central bank 
sells government bonds to the public, it receives money and hence takes 
liquidity out of the market (Gilpin 2001: 371). 
A different tool is the discount or repo rate that regulates the rate at which 
financial institutions can borrow money from the central bank. Further, 
central banks can adjust reserve requirements for commercial banks 
(Gilpin 2001: 372). The reserve requirement is critical to central banks' 
monopoly of money emission. It ensures collateral influence on money 
substitutes such as credit cards issued by commercial banks. 
These three monetary tools are the main transmission channels by which 
central banks can influence the short-term interest rate20 relatively 
precisely. The central bank sets an upper or lower ceiling for short-term 
interest rates in a competitive banking sector. 
The long-term interest rates relate to fixed-interest bearing assets and 
shares and are not as closely controlled by central banks21. However, they 
usually lie above the short-term rates. Long-term assets are less liquid 
than short-term substitutes. If economic agents face fundamental 
insecurity about the future and favour flexibility or liquid assets, they will 
usually demand a higher premium for long-term assets. Further, 
expectations about monetary policy and asset valuations influence long-
term rates. In most instances there is an inverse relationship between 
interest rates and asset values. If short-term interest rates rise, fixed-
interest-bearing assets and shares become less attractive as an 
investment or store of value (Keynes 1936). However, if investors 
20 Defined as the three month money market (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008) 
21 Alan Blinder has put it this way: "( ... ) the interest rate that the central bank can control 
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anticipate economic decline, long-term rates can sink below short-term 
rates since financing in the present appears more risky. 
The dissertation utilises real short-term interest rates as an indicator of 
monetary policy (see Tables 1 & 2) as they can be controlled by central 
banks and usually do set a lower ceiling for the long-term rates. Real 
interest rates take inflation or growth into account. Nominal interest rates 
do not allow for any comparison of monetary policy, because identical 
interest rates can be relatively low or high under different economic 
conditions. 
3.1.3 A theoretical concept of money 
The present dissertation adheres to a (post-)Keynesian perspective on 
monetary policy. That perspective is fully in line with Susan Strange's 
argument that financial power or the ability to lend has a pronounced 
impact on economic development (Strange 1988: 90). 
The distinction between the short and the long run as suggested by 
neoclassical economics is irrelevant, since economic agents face 
fundamental insecurity about the future22 (Moore 2006b: 112-119). Even in 
neoclassical economics the capital stock affects growth potential (Solow 
1956: 65-94). Hence, the assertion that money has an influence on the 
capital stock in the short run but no impact in the long run is not 
convincing. 
In Post-Keynesian economics the domestic wage bargaining system or 
social contract is of crucial importance to financial power as unit labour 
costs mostly explain inflation. Economies with centralised wage bargaining 
systems (corporatist model) usually experienced moderate inflation since 
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1395-1434). Monetary policies can be less restrictive if effectively 
coordinated with wage policy. Anyhow, not all central banks are willing to 
loosen or coordinate monetary policy in response to corporatist trade 
unions (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank). 
However, EMU member states have concentrated on adjusting monetary 
policies and increasing financial power rather than adjusting the domestic 
social contract to deflate their economies. Restrictive monetary policies or 
unemployment are more readily available tools for keeping inflation at bay. 
The adjustment of the domestic social contract is a far more complicated 
and time-consuming process for governments. It may provoke political 
opposition from domestic interest groups. Independent central banks are 
democratically less accountable and hence less permissive towards 
political opposition23 . Further, the external sources of inflation (exchange 
rates, prices of imported goods) are often of greater relevance to small 
vulnerable economies with a pronounced openness to trade than domestic 
sources. To the contrary, most European countries have sufficiently 
weakened their social contracts to withstand competitive pressures from a 
monetary union without economic governance (Herr & Kasandziska 2007: 
131-162). 
The next chapter will illustrate that the ability to pursue favourable 
monetary policy (lowering interest rates, thus making a greater variety of 
alternative investments profitable) without inflationary pressures is heavily 
conditioned by the international monetary system and its distribution of 
financial power. 
22 Keynes famously observed in the Treatise on Money (1936) "In the long run we are all 
dead!" 
23 The influential civil servant of the British Treasury Sir Alan Budd argued that many in 
the Thatcher government "never believed for a moment that [monetarism] was the correct 
way to bring down inflation. They did however see that this would be a very good way to 
raise unemployment. And raising unemployment was an extremely desirable way of 
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3.2. Financial power: The role of the international monetary system 
The adequate design of the exchange rate regime has split generations of 
economists. Free market economists usually favoured flexible exchange 
rates, whereas Keynesian economists argued for fixed but adjustable or 
no exchange rates. However, the division has even cut across economic 
paradigms (Sardoni & Wray 2007: 53-77). 
Lately, the economic mainstream tends to emphasize the comer solutions 
of the exchange rate regime; irrevocably fixed or freely floating exchange 
rates (Summers 2000: 1-17). The core of the debate is the so-called 
unholy trinity, which states that economic policy can never reconcile more 
than two goals at the same time: monetary policy independence, 
openness to capital flows and stable or fixed exchange rates (Gilpin 2001: 
248). 
The chapter will illustrate the controversy and develop a theoretical 
perspective on how the monetary or exchange rate regime affects financial 
power. Based on that analysis, the dominant fashion of corner solutions 
and the claim of an unholy trinity will be reviewed critically. 
3.2.1 The case for flexible exchange rates 
The case for flexible exchange rates is fundamental to the controversy on 
monetary sovereignty and will be illustrated in detail. 
Flexible exchange rates are usually seen as a necessary buffer against 
real shocks to the economy or wage and price rigidity (De Grauwe 1997: 
5-11). Further, only flexible exchange rates would allow monetary policy 
autonomy while fixed exchange rates support fiscal policy (Mundell 1962; 
Fleming 1962). 
The argument for exchange rates being a buffer against real shocks 
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Optimum Currency Areas (OCAs). OCA theories tried to establish criteria 
that may answer the question of whether exchange rates between regions 
or countries are necessary or superfluous. An exogenous shock may 
occur due to a sudden shift in economic policy or even natural disasters 
such as an earthquake. The latter example shall illustrate the case: 
An earthquake that destroys most of the productive capacity of a region or 
industry would be labelled a negative supply shock (negatively affecting 
the supply side of the economy). Since a reduction in productive capacity 
ceteris paribus causes inflation (demand for goods and services remains 
the same), the industry or region loses competitiveness (inflation) and jobs 
(less output). Monetary policy is complicated in such a situation, because 
a lowering of interest rates might accelerate inflation while a tightening of 
monetary policy will make new investment dear. Consequently, there 
remain four options to counteract the negative effects of a negative supply 
shock: Firstly, the domestic currency might be devalued to restore 
competitiveness. Secondly, producer might lower prices and sacrifice 
profits to stabilise market shares. Thirdly, workers could abstain from 
wage increases as a response to inflation. Fourthly, workers could migrate 
into the competitive region that wins market shares or conversely capital 
could flow into the affected region realising higher returns on investment. 
Consequently, OCA theories assume that in the absence of flexible wages 
and prices or factor mobility (labour and capital) exchange rate 
adjustments are required (and vice versa) (Mundell 1962). Hence, OCA 
theory is open to both outcomes: the need for exchange rate adjustments 
with sticky prices and immobile factors of production, and the abolition of 
exchange rates (monetary union) if prices or factors of production are 
sufficiently flexible. 
The purchasing power parity (PPP) and the (uncovered) interest parity 
(UIP) are the very basis of the case for flexible exchange rates. They can 
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e* = i* = p* (Flassbeck 2001: 13) 
The relationship suggests that in the long run with exchange rate 
expectations being rational exchange rate expectations (e*) will always 
equal the interest rate differential (i*) and price level differential (p*) across 
economies. For example, if the price level or the interest rate in a domestic 
economy rises more than in a foreign economy (the former amounts to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, since domestic goods buy more 
foreign goods), the expected nominal exchange rate will also rise from the 
perspective of the domestic economy (its currency will depreciate). The 
real exchange rate thus remains stable in the long run (see Appendix I). 
In consequence, exchange rates will always equalise the purchasing 
power across economies, eliminating sustained trade imbalances. Further, 
expected returns on currencies reflect the nominal interest rate differential 
and expected changes in the nominal exchange rate. Hence, according to 
UIP, financial arbitrage will restore equilibrium on the asset markets 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 394-396, see Appendix /I). 
These assumptions have a pronounced impact on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy: 
If the neoclassical proposition on money and UIP holds, a (temporary or 
permanent)24 monetary stimulus can at best restore full-employment within 
given capacities. In the long run the currency will appreciate after the 
money supply has been increased and prices will rise (neutralising any 
further effects on output). Permanent fiscal policy is assumed to be 
ineffective under flexible exchange rates since it "crowds out" private 
investment and the exchange rate will negatively affect the trade balance25 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 450-460). 
24 A policy is usually defined as permanent over the time span of one year. 
25 Post-Keynesian proponents of flexible exchange rates do not share that perspective. 
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Conversely, the adverse impact of fiscal policy on the exchange rate may 
be neutralised under a fixed exchange rate regime. But monetary policy is 
difficult in the presence of free movement of capital. Financial investors 
will not be willing to hold currency assets with a lower return (interest rate) 
without an expected currency appreciation. Economic policy has to restrict 
the movement of capital (Mundell 1962; Fleming 1962). 
In sum, monetary policy can only (temporarily) affect the output of an 
economy under flexible exchange rates or if the free movement of capital 
is restricted. This constitutes the core of the unholy trinity. 
3.2.2. The case for fixed but adjustable exchange rates 
A system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates requires a multilateral 
approach to the determination of currencies, whereas a monetary regime 
of flexible exchange rates has a unilateral character (self-help regime). As 
shown previously, proponents of flexible exchange rates argue that there 
is no need for a multilateral coordination of exchange rates, since financial 
markets create equal conditions for any currency. No government can 
exploit monetary policy or the exchange rate, since PPP and UIP will 
always prevail. Further, a regime of flexible exchange rates is assumed to 
guarantee enough financial power to restore full employment (while a 
system of fixed exchange rates limits monetary sovereignty). 
Instead, fixed but adjustable exchange rates or the elimination of any 
exchange rate (if price levels have suffiCiently converged) are being 
argued for three reasons: Firstly, many of the assumptions stipulated 
within the framework of OCA, PPP and UIP do not hold in the real world. 
Further, "given the unknown level of future exchange rates, exchange 
rates feed on the expectation of other agents" (Moore 2006b: 414). Hence, 
counter the effects on the exchange rate associated with fiscal policy (Sardoni & Wray 
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flexible exchange rates easily deviate from their fundamentals in the short 
run. Secondly, governments in a self-help regime have an incentive to 
unilaterally manipulate exchange rates or monetary policy. This can be 
done by tightening monetary policy (appreciating the currency) in the fight 
against inflation or conversely by depreciating the currency and stimulating 
exports (Moore 2006b: 414). Thirdly, the elimination of exchange-rate risks 
contributes to stable expectations, reduced transaction costs and thus 
eases trade (Flassbeck 2004: 3). 
However, there is a fundamental difference between fixed (but adjustable) 
exchange rates and a monetary union: No matter how credible 
commitments to exchange rate parities are being enforced, a risk remains 
that a change in government or the political environment might force 
currency realignment. Investing in the sunk costs of a common currency 
will diminish these risks (Eichengreen 1993: 1330). 
The following chapter will develop a perspective on these controversies. 
3.2.3 A theoretical perspective on exchange rates 
The neoclassical OCA theories and the notion of exchange rates being a 
buffer against real shocks are inconsistent: 
If an exogenous shock such as an earthquake destroys most of the 
productive capacity of a country, it will cause inflation. According to the 
OCA theory, the loss in competitiveness and employment can be either 
compensated by flexible wages and prices, mobility of factors of 
production26 , or flexible exchange rates (since the country's currency will 
depreciate). 
26 However, it is sensible to assume that labour mobility in Europe will remain well below 
that of a currency area such as the United States with a common language and a federal 
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In a neoclassical framework the real wage has to be lowered in order to 
restore full employment. However, if both nominal wages and prices are 
flexible, the real wage consequently may not adjust at all. Hence, flexibility 
of the real wage requires instead sticky prices or wages27 (Bofinger & 
Flassbeck 2000: 22). 
Neoclassical and new consensus economists argue that monetary policy 
is ineffective in time (see chapter 3.1). An increase in the money supply 
can only temporarily "fool" economic agents until prices adjust. Completely 
rational agents will not react to a monetary stimulUS at all as they expect 
prices to rise in the long run. However, it is not clear why economic agents 
should accept a depreciation of the national currency and thus a loss of 
monetary value in space (i.e. higher import prices) if they do not accept a 
loss of monetary value in time (i.e. by demanding higher wages in 
response to inflation). Consequently, if there is a restriction on monetary 
policy in time (money illusion) it must be equally applied to exchange rate 
changes or monetary policy in space (Flassbeck 2001: 17). 
If currency depreciations help countries to cope with competitive 
pressures, neutrality of money is obsolete. But even in that case 
governments instead of markets could still enforce exchange rate 
adjustments. However, competitive devaluation is subject to Keynes 
famous "fallacy of composition". Although it is a rational option for a single 
country, it is clearly inefficient if exchange rates are devalued in many 
countries at the same time. "Beggar thy neighbour" becomes "beggar 
yourself' (as happened in response to global economic crisis between the 
first and second world wars) (Muchlinski 2005: 69). 
While OCA theory is inconsistent, the PPP is very restrictive. In the real 
world not all goods and services are tradable (i.e. because of high 
27 Further, in a neoclassical framework the lowering of prices by producers is usually not 
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transport costs). The price level across national baskets of commodities 
can change without affecting the trade balance (8alassa 1964; see 
Appendix III). However, why should a purely statistical phenomenon 
(8alassa-Samuelson-effect) require a change in the exchange rate if the 
competitive situation between countries has not changed? Further, 
exchange rate changes may negatively affect innovation and thus 
economic development. If the exchange rate offsets lower price levels that 
were earned with increases in productivity, it eliminates incentives for 
innovation (Flassbeck 2000: 13; see Appendix 11/). 
However, the speculative and erratic behaviour of financial investors and 
currencies is the central objection against the determination of exchange 
rates by markets. Financial investors do not want to buy goods, but they 
want to make profits. Hence, even if they know that PPP will prevail in the 
long run, they will risk holding a currency with a higher return in the short 
run. Since economic behaviour is characterised by uncertainty (as 
opposed to probability such as the risks calculated by insurances) the long 
run is irrelevant for the decisions of economic agents (Moore 2006b: 13-
38). Exchange rates will tend to deviate from their PPP level in the short 
run and cause a loss of economic welfare. Hence, necessary adjustments 
of the exchange rate, wages and price levels could be better enforced by 
monetary policy or via the domestic wage bargaining system. 
In sum, if exchange rate adjustments are only needed in the case of 
sustained trade imbalances, PPP could be well enforced by governments 
or central banks. The credibility of central banks' commitment (along with 
capital restrictions) to enforce exchange rates enables favourable 
monetary policy. Consequently, only the capacity level of the economy 
and the trade balance limits monetary policy. 
Therefore, no exchange rates are needed between economies where 
price levels have sufficiently converged (despite a failure to meet OCA 
criteria such as mobility of labour etc.). External shocks or sustained trade 
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country) do not justify erratic exchange rates. A common currency 
guarantees higher leverage against financial markets (lower interest 
rates), reduced exchange rate risks and transaction costs. The capacity of 
stable exchange rates to ease trade is an important reason why even 
states with relatively much financial power do not leave exchange rates to 
the market2s. 
Trade patterns within the EU are highly unbalanced (see chapter 6.3). EU 
countries with little financial power and weak social contracts usually run 
trade deficits. Hence, EMU is not fully explained with stabilising trade. 
Indeed, countries with less financial power had to sacrifice the option of 
devaluation of their domestic currency. Consequently, the increased 
leverage against financial markets offered by a common currency must 
have outweighed the advantages of unilateral exchange rate policy. 
In contrast, in countries with a greater dependence on trade or high 
competitiveness such as Germany or the Benelux countries the benefits of 
monetary integration for easing trade must have played a decisive role29 . 
External shocks or sustained trade imbalances in a monetary union 
required either a well functioning domestic social contract or compensation 
(i.e. structural funds) for the negatively affected region (as would be the 
case within a single country with strong regional disparities). If these 
conditions are not met and economic policies are not coordinated on a 
regional level, monetary union may diSintegrate as nation states enjoy 
greater democratic legitimacy. 
28 Between 1998 and 2007 trade in the EU rose from 26 to 33 per cent of GOP. Empirical 
studies suggest that up to 3 per cent of this increase in trade can be attributed to a 
common currency benefiting specifically Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2008). 
29 The exchange rate instability such as witnessed during the European exchange rate 
mechanisms of the 1980s or the Asian financial crisis in 1998 has largely affected trade 
(Dieter 2008: 8). However, the external dependence of South East Asian developing 
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The next chapter will illustrate real world responses to the uneven 
distribution of financial power and review the concept of unholy trinity 
critically. 
3.2.4 The unholy duality: Exchange rate policy in the real world 
In the real world financial power is unevenly distributed across nations and 
currency areas.3D Financial speculation may pronounce the uneven 
distribution of financial power, since certain currencies enjoy more 
confidence among financial investors. Depending on the domestic social 
contract and the openness to trade, a flexible adjustment of the exchange 
rate may lead to higher inflation and hence restrict financial power31. 
Therefore, central banks or governments that do not wish to leave the 
exchange rate to the market and who enjoy little financial power have to 
offer much higher real interest rates than countries with more financial 
power to attract foreign capital, stabilise the currency, and keep inflation 
under control. (UNCTAD 2004: 128). 
The following examples illustrate real world responses to the current 
unilateral exchange rate system. The examples illustrate the stylised 
experiences of developing countries that serve to concisely show the 
conflict between little financial power and monetary sovereignty. 
Unilateral Solutions: Flexible exchange rates and free flows of capital 
Some emerging economies (e.g. Brazil and South Africa) have opted for 
the corner solution of capital account openness, high real interest rates 
30 Currencies do usually correspond with national borders rather than satisfying 
normative criteria such as stipulated within the framework of OCAs (Goodhart 2007: 99-
100). 
31 Even the monetary policy of the most powerful and independent central banks in the 
world such as the ECB can only be fully explained with reference to the exchange rate. 
While the ECB officially neglects any consideration of the exchange rate in conducting its 
monetary policy and operates within the largest internal market of the world, empirical 
tests indicate that its monetary policy reflects the exchange rate with other relevant areas 
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and growth being conditioned by capital inflows to finance economic 
development. Developing countries usually rely on import of technology or 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). If the domestic currency is not fully 
convertible (restriction on capital flows), it might negatively affect the inflow 
of FDI (UNCTAD 2006: 205). Additionally, financial markets in these 
countries have not deepened enough to offer alternatives to traditional 
bank finance and foreign borrowing from the leading financial centres such 
as local bond markets (Stevens 2004: 68). However, the incoming capital 
flows are very often short-term financial portfolio investments. They can 
cause temporary growth episodes but may soon reverse and cause 
unstable conditions for economic development. Further, they do not 
translate into FDI. For example, South Africa has experienced 
comparatively little inward FDI despite a pronounced openness to capital 
flows (UNCTAD 2006: 24). FDI seems rather driven by factors such as 
growth of the world economy, a good infrastructure and low unit labour 
costs within a region with a sufficiently attractive internal market than by 
openness of the capital account (UNCTAD 1998). 
Unilateral solution: Fixed exchange rate and free flows of capital 
The opposite case of the corner solution is an irreversibly fixed exchange 
rate or a unilateral peg of the exchange rate (currency board; see 
Appendix IV). Argentina had opted for dollarisation of its economy 
between 1991 and 2002 to restrict domestic inflation and benefit from the 
financial power of the anchor currency (Hanke 2002: 203-222). 
However, such a unilateral exchange rate policy can only succeed if the 
domestic conditions in the anchor and the anchoring country converge. In 
other words, a country with little financial power or higher domestic 
inflation has to bring down inflation to the same level as the anchor 
country. In every year where the gap between the value of the domestic 
currency and the anchor country is narrowed, the inflation differential has 
to be reduced by the same margin to avoid external disturbances. 
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depreciated the real and the Argentinean peso was overvalued. Since 
financial investors knew that the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) would 
not support the unilateral exchange rate alignment in a self-help regime, 
Argentina had to finally abandon the peg (Flassbeck 2001: 33-36). 
Unilateral solution: Capital restrictions 
Many Asian countries instead favoured selective capital restrictions to 
increase their financial power and address domestic needs with monetary 
policy. China, for example, operates its exchange rate on the basis of 
managed floating. China ties its currency to a basket of important 
currencies while practically fixing the exchange rate to the dollar (Karwai 
2007: 113). The competitive devaluation of the exchange rate stimulates 
export-led growth. China demonstrates that a country with a sufficiently 
attractive internal market can successfully operate selective capital 
restrictions without discouraging FDI. The outstanding export performance 
is not only due to the exchange rate but also to capital restrictions. Capital 
restrictions have secured low real interest rates and enabled Chinese 
enterprises to invest in their technological base to become sufficiently 
competitive on the world market. Hence, increased trade integration and 
the accumulation of foreign exchange were rather a consequence of 
growth than vice versa (Flassbeck, Dullien & Geiger 2005: 1_43)32. 
Unholy duality 
These real world examples indicate that unilateral corner solutions of the 
exchange rate regime do not operate well in the absence of capital 
32 Recent efforts for monetary integration in Asia suggest that regionalism does not 
require the sequencing established in Europe where trade integration preceded monetary 
integration. Presently, possible welfare gains from free trade are lower since barriers to 
trade were markedly higher in the 1960s (Dieter 2000). Hence, eliminating exchange rate 
fluctuations may be a cheaper alternative for trade integration than the complex 
certification of products and services for preferential trade agreements (Dieter 2006: 103). 
Further, restrictions on trade and capital flows may circumvent destabilising effects from 
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restrictions or sufficient financial power. Hence, according to Heiner 
Flassbeck, the unholy trinity has to be restated as unholy duality: In 
economies with little financial power monetary sovereignty and capital 
mobility are irreconcilable, irrespective of the exchange rate regime. 
Floating exchange rates are not superior to fixed (but adjusted) exchange 
rates in terms of monetary sovereignty. Monetary sovereignty is 
determined by the domestic social contract and the scope of international 
monetary cooperation (Flassbeck 2001: 39-43). 
Monetary policy in economies with little financial power has either to be 
conducted on a multilateral level (fixed but adjusted exchange rates or 
currency unions), or capital mobility has to be restricted unilaterally. 
Countries with a rather unilateral tradition that can be traced to a lack of 
cooperation on security issues (e.g. in most Asian states) will usually 
favour unilateral solutions (Webber 2007: 156-159)33. Thus, economies 
with little financial power and/or economies with weak social contracts 
have to either restrict capital flows or to opt for a multilateral solution such 
as currency unions. 
Any financial regime has repercussions on national economies. Monetary 
sovereignty with flexible exchange rates is a myth, because financial 
power is unevenly distributed and money is an international collective 
good. The current self-help regime emerged after the breakdown of the 
US-led Bretton Woods financial system and limits countries' ability to fully 
use monetary policy for domestic needs. Hence, it easily translates into 
what Raymond Vernon labelled sovereignty-at-bay (Vernon 1971). 
The dissertation argues that EMU should be explained with the desire of 
most member countries to consolidate their financial power while those 
33 However. the experience of the financial crisis in Asia has recently contributed to 
regional financial cooperation (Dieter & Higgott 2003: 430-455). Apparently. the collective 
experience of vulnerability is a serious precondition for integration efforts as witnessed in 
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with more financial power or a pronounced openness to trade tried to 
preserve favourable trade patterns. 
4. Preliminary Conclusions 
Eclectic state-centric realism explains European integration most 
adequately. A specific hegemonic environment with the US sponsoring 
European integration has enabled deeper European regionalism. 
Regionalism has been a process of bargains between nation states: 
The UK and the Scandinavian Countries sacrificed national sovereignty 
less voluntarily. They developed a unilateral response to economic and 
political challenges. The UK's attitude towards European integration has 
been influenced by its former role of World Power and its special 
relationship with the United States. Continental European integration has 
been largely driven by France's security concerns and the desire to avoid 
constant confrontation with its rival hegemon Germany. Germany's 
approach to integration has aimed at partially regaining political 
sovereignty as a precondition for economic recovery. The Benelux and the 
Southern Mediterranean Countries had a rather functionalist approach to 
integration as they posses only limited relative power. They tried to gain 
influence by sponsoring integration and bargained their own position on 
specific integration issues in a very flexible manner. However, they differ 
markedly in their approach to market-based integration. In sum, European 
integration has been primarily policy-driven and only later focused on 
economic and monetary affairs. 
Financial power defined as the ability to stimulate economic development 
with sufficient provision of credit is conditioned by the domestic social 
contract and the monetary or exchange rate regime. Robert Schrire's 
argument that countries and regions are differently affected by 
globalisation also holds true for financial markets (Schrire 2000: 49-66). 
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regionalism is a response to the unholy duality of monetary sovereignty 
and capitalliberalisation. 
The case study will evaluate the theoretical argument against the 
background of the EMU. Chapter 5 will analyse financial globalisation 
during the Bretton Woods financial system and illustrate early monetary 
responses in Europe. Chapter 6 will portray the process towards EMU and 
illustrate national approaches to monetary regionalism. Chapter 7 will 
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5. The history of the Bretton Woods financial system 
The Bretton Woods system was the only multilateral, albeit hegemonic, 
system of financial governance since the emergence of financial 
leadership. The chapter will recapture the rise and demise of Bretton 
Woods in order to illustrate how financial globalisation spurred the 
development of EMU. 34 
Before World War I international capital flows had reached high levels and 
controls on capital flows were mostly absent. The interwar period 
witnessed the collapse of the monetary order and the spread of capital 
controls accompanied by a decline in international movements of capital. 
The post-World War II era was governed by the Bretton Woods system 
and the gradual recovery of financial flows following the relaxation of 
capital controls. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system 
in 1971 high capital mobility has been restored again (Eichengreen 1996: 
3). 
Chapter 5.1 illustrates that financial power and leadership played a crucial 
role in determining domestic currency regimes even before the term 
globalisation had been coined. 
5.1. The pre-Bretton Woods era 
The bimetallic monetary order of the pre-Bretton Woods era developed 
into a gold standard around the 1870s. The gold standard substituted 
different commodity-money standards before the final advent of fiat 
money5 and fractional reserve banking. Central banks only gradually 
secured the monopoly of money emission and became a public institution. 
34 The chapter draws primarily on Eichengreen (1996) 
35 Fiat money stands for paper money not backed by gold, convertible foreign exchange 
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They navigated constantly between defending the gold parity and the role 
as a lender of last resort (Eichengreen 1996: 7-8). 
5.1.1 Bimetallism 
Many countries minted gold and silver coins throughout the nineteenth 
century (bimetallic standard). They managed the simultaneous circulation 
of the metals by requiring the mint to supply coins with legal tender status 
to the public in exchange for specified qualities of silver or gold at a fixed 
ratio. If the prices on the world market for these metals changed, it created 
incentives for arbitrage and could strip a bimetallic country of its 
underpriced metal (Eichengreen 1996: 10-12; see Appendix V). 
England accidentally adopted the gold standard in that way. Silver had 
become underpriced at its mint and led to a huge inflow of Brazilian gold 
that could not be reversed by small adjustments in the mint ratio. In 1821 
England finally abolished any legal tender status of silver (Eichengreen 
1996: 12). 
The next chapter captures the working of the gold regime. 
5.1.2 The emergence of the Gold Standard 
Money is a public good. It caused the complicated maintenance of 
bimetallism and the long transition to gold. As long as most countries 
circulated both metals there were advantages to maintain the same 
standard as the rest of the world (network externalities) (Eichengreen 
1996: 13-15). 
The circulation of foreign silver with different degrees of fineness led to 
arbitrage and a flood of less valuable money (i.e. Italian silver coins) while 
more valuable money (i.e. French silver) was hoarded. International 
agreements were negotiated for the harmonisation of silver coinage and 
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had already abolished silver from circulation, and the US with a strong 
agrarian silver lobby was only beginning to recover from its civil war. 
Germany finally shifted towards gold as its Eastern European trading 
partners provided only inconvertible paper currency and the financing of its 
foreign commerce had been financed with London-based credits 
denominated in British sterling. Since Germany had been a major 
industrial power in Continental Europe and promised more monetary 
stability than its adversary France, the German decision finally tipped the 
balance in favour of gold (Eichengreen 1996: 16-18). 
In the 1880s the deflationary bias of the gold standard (too little money in 
circulation) became apparent. However, coordination problems were an 
obstacle to a return of smaller economies into bimetallism. The dangers of 
driving good money (gold) out of circulation (mint ratio) and eruptive 
exchange rate fluctuations against gold countries (inflation differentials) 
were too great (Eichengreen 1996: 20). 
According to David Hume's price-specie flow model, an outflow of gold 
lowered domestic prices and hence balanced trade. However, actual 
capital movements were substantially larger than the balance of 
commodity trade, due to foreign lending. Further, gold shipments did not 
occur on a scale predicted by the model. Only the discount rate explained 
the real world deviations from the model. Central banks intervened by 
adjusting the interest rate, affecting the price level and thus avoiding an 
outflow of gold. However, many central banks were still private entities that 
tried to maximise profits with interest rates. The growth of private banking 
threatened the business of central banks. Too high interest rates could 
deprive central banks of their market. With time central banks learned how 
to operate OM Os and became a public institution (Eichengreen 1996: 25-
27). 
Barry Eichengreen argues that the discipline of gold worked so effectively, 
because labour was in a weak position (absence of workers' voting rights), 
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stabilising exchange rates. Financial investors were convinced of central 
banks' commitments to defend gold. They rationally anticipated monetary 
policy quite accurately and stabilised exchange rates prior to central bank 
interventions (Eichengreen 1996: 31). 
However, an increase in a country's discount rate would generate 
immediate repercussions in other countries, provoking an outflow of gold. 
In the absence of global coordination, the Bank of England (BOE) 
emerged as financial leader and other central banks adjusted their 
monetary policy accordingly36. In several cases central banks successfully 
cooperated when investors' confidence in gold eroded. Central banks' 
commitment and temporary escape clauses saved the gold regime 
(Eichengreen 1996: 25-38). 
In sum, fixed exchange rates and trade integration mutually supported 
each other. However, the gold regime in Continental and Northern Europe 
rested upon a lack of democratic rights and a highly unequal distribution of 
financial and commercial power. Countries with democratic reforms such 
as universal suffrage enjoyed less confidence of financial investors. The 
regime required a close fit between lending activity and export of capital 
goods in most countries of the European core (Eichengreen 1996: 42-44). 
36 Countries on the periphery did not enjoy the same kind of monetary solidarity. Primary 
producing countries were faced with large goods market shocks due to narrow production 
patterns and commodity exports. Britain, however, was a major producer of capital 
goods. Its overseas lending activity usually generated additional demand for its own 
production, stabilising its balance of payments. In contrast, countries on the periphery 
were threatened by trade deficits and capital flight. Even the US experienced monetary 
instability since democratisation (universal male suffrage) had undermined confidence in 
the commitment towards gold. Gradually, deposit money was topped on monetary gold in 
rapidly industrialiSing nations and dissolved the deflationary bias of gold. However, 
pressures for currency depreciation continued to plague agrarian countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Portugal and the United States. Landowners with fixed 
mortgages favoured inflation and exporters pressured for currency depreCiation 
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The next chapter specifies the inadequacy of the gold regime for equitable 
economic expansion if domestic policy is constrained by financial 
investors. 
5.1.3 The crisis of the Gold Standard 
The crisis of the gold standard was fuelled by a shift of military and 
commercial power during and after World War I. The US occupied an 
increasingly powerful position in the international arena while the position 
of Britain and Continental Europe eroded. 
During the war, Britain had been forced to sell off many of its foreign 
assets. The close relationship between foreign investment and export of 
capital good loosened. Continental countries such as Germany became 
debtors and depended upon capital imports from the US (Eichengreen 
1996: 45). 
Gold fuelled the war machine, and governments prohibited gold exports. 
The disruption of gold market arbitrage led to floating exchange rates, 
which had only been limited by capital controls. The governments 
suspended the backing of their currencies with gold or foreign exchange 
and issued fiat money (Eichengreen 1996: 46-47). 
The War also ended fiscal support by the US for its French and British 
allies. Consequently, Britain suspended convertibility. Among the major 
currencies only the US dollar remained convertible into gold. Hence, the 
first half of the 1920s was marked by freely floating exchange rates. 
Floating exchange rates led to erratic currency values, destabilised trade 
and aggravated inflation. Hence, Ragnar Nurkse prepared a very 
pessimistic account of a flexible currency regime to the League of Nations 
(Nurkse 1944) while others such as Milton Friedman traced the erratic 
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Despite contending views on the sources of instability (markets vs. policy) 
an international consensus emerged for re-establishing the gold standard. 
Both those in favour of more stable exchange rates and those who lobbied 
for discipline in domestic politics thought that the gold standard would 
assist their intention. Further, the network externalities of currency regimes 
(public good) enabled a collective return of countries into gold 
(Eichengreen 1996: 57). 
However, the period between the return of a record number of countries to 
the gold standard and its final demise (with the devaluation of the British 
Sterling) lasted only from 1926 until 1931. The adjustment mechanism no 
longer worked, and huge trade imbalances persisted. Japan and the US 
increasingly penetrated the markets of Latin America and Asia that had 
previously served as destinations for European exports. The US lent its 
surplus back to Europe to finance the continent's current account deficit. 
When the US raised interest rates to cool down its economy and defend 
the gold cover ratio, capital outflows depressed European economies. 
However, before the specie-price flow model could even operate and 
restore the trade balance, the Great Depression hurt European export 
markets (Eichengreen 1996: 48; 69-71). 
The competitive devaluation of the sterling area and Central and Eastern 
European exchange controls eroded the payments position of the gold 
bloc. When the former British Empire gave up the gold cover, the tide 
turned. In order to defend their reserves and stand the test of the markets, 
gold countries applied restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, further 
depressing the economy and aggravating mass unemployment. Financial 
investors, anticipating a policy shift in response to domestic pressures, 
sold gold-backed currencies, which provoked an even firmer restrictive 
policy. Finally, the gold countries had to suspend convertibility and 
depreciate their currencies, triggering a new round of global mercantilism. 
The unilateral responses via devaluation (beggar-thy-neighbour) further 











Financial Power & Monetary Regionalism 
In sum, three factors made a return to gold impossible: Firstly, the trade-off 
between external (exchange rates) and internal (domestic policy) 
objectives. Secondly, the changing pattern of international capital flows, 
which further destabilised exchange rates. Investors had lost confidence in 
monetary discipline. Thirdly, the trading patterns after World War I ceased 
to fit the international monetary order "like a hand in a glove" (Eichengreen 
1996: 91). 
The next chapter illustrates how the negotiations of Bretton Woods 
reflected the unequal distribution of power. 
5.2 The Bretton Woods financial system 
The Bretton Woods system differed from the gold standard in three 
important aspects: Fixed exchange rates became adjustable under 
specific circumstances (defined as fundamental disequilibrium), providing 
an alternative to the deflationary measures required under the gold 
standard. Controls on capital flows were applied and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) had been established in order to monitor national 
economic policies and finance countries troubled by balance of payment 
deficits. Further, a scarce currency clause provided sanctions (exchange 
and trade restrictions) against countries with a sustained trade surplus 
(Eichengreen 1996: 93-94). 
In reality, exchange rates were rarely adjusted and the Fund's resources 
were too little to manage the extraordinary post-war payment problems 
that plagued Europe. The scarce currency clause was never applied. 
Capital controls worked quite effiCiently even though the relaxation of 
current account restrictions complicated their maintenance. However, the 
increased relaxation of restrictions and the absence of critical adjustments 
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5.2.1 The design of the Bretton Woods financial system 
The negotiations at Bretton Woods were led by John Maynard Keynes 
(UK) and Harry Dexter White (USA). During the Bretton Woods 
negotiations the former financial leader UK aimed at a multilateral financial 
order distributing the burden of adjustment more equally among surplus 
and deficit countries. The United States instead tried to consolidate their 
position as new financial leader and trading power previously acquired 
during two world wars (Eichengreen 1996: 96).37 
The Keynes plan envisaged international money (see Appendix VI), fixed 
but adjustable exchange rates and the application of exchange and trade 
restrictions to reconcile full employment with payments balance. Keynes 
further pledged for extensive balance of payment financing subject to 
conditionality and penalty interest rates (penalising both abundant deficit 
and surplus countries measured against an index of trade). If a country 
had run a persistent payment surplus (as the US did in the 1930s), it would 
have been obligated to finance the drawing rights of other countries. White 
instead aimed at a world free of controls on capital and trade plus fixed 
exchange rates where exceptional adjustment had to be overseen by an 
international institution with veto power (Eichengreen 1996: 96-97). 
The Joint Statement agreed on in 1943 reflected the asymmetric 
bargaining power of the two parties. The controversial positions on 
exchange rates discharged into an "adjustable peg". No international 
money was agreed on. The quotas specified came closer to White's plan 
(in theory requiring greater exchange rate flexibility to cope with balance of 
payment problems). Countries were obligated to declare par values for 
their currencies in terms of gold or a currency convertible in gold (which 
37 White "( ... ) was sitting on an enormous stockpile of gold that had been accumulating 
ever since Roosevelt had fixed the price of gold at $35 an ounce in 1934, and he was 
determined to reduce it through a rapid build-up in international trade as soon as the war 
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meant the US dollar) and to hold their currency values within 1 per cent of 
those levels. Par values could be changed by 10 per cent in reaction to an 
unspecified "fundamental disequilibrium" following consultations with the 
IMF, by larger margins only with the approval of three quarters of its voting 
power (Eichengreen 1996: 97). 
However, Britain succeeded in permitting the maintenance of capital 
controls and authorising controls on imports from countries with persistent 
payment surplus (scarce currency clause). It further secured a limited 
period in which controls on current transactions could be maintained 
(Eichengreen 1996: 98). In sum, the Bretton Woods system could be 
labelled a "gold-dollar standard" (BMF 1977: 22). 
5.2.2 The Bretton Woods financial system and trade liberalisation 
The European trade deficit indicated immense unsatisfied demands for 
food, capital goods and other merchant products. It worsened the dollar 
shortage and soon dwarfed the modest quotas and drawing rights of the 
agreement. In response, the US extended 13 billion US dollars or four 
times the European drawing rights and more than six times the amount of 
the US obligations to Europe as Marshall Aid between 1948 and 1951 (the 
first years of IMF operations). In 1949 European currencies were devalued 
by an average of 30 per cent and import controls remained in place 
(Eichengreen 1996: 98). 
However, the US priority was clearly on re-liberalising global trade. From 
that perspective extensive trade would deepen the interdependence of the 
French and the German economy, suppress political conflicts, prevent 
future wars, fuel economic recovery, and provide Europe with hard 
currency earnings needed to import raw materials and capital goods 
(Eichengreen 1996: 99). The US acceded to the monetary provisions of 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)38. The Bretton Woods agreement 
prohibited restrictions on current account transaction without Fund 
approval and obligated countries to substantially remove monetary 
restrictions on trade within the first five years of the IMF's operation. 
However, while trade was gradually liberalised, the transitional period 
stretched to twice the length (Eichengreen 1996: 99-100). 
Currencies in Europe would have been clearly overvalued if restrictions on 
trade were to be removed. Wartime inflation had been much higher in 
Europe than in the United States, but half of the exchange rates against 
the US dollar remained at their pre-World War II level. Hence, trade 
restrictions could only be removed without causing unsustainable deficits if 
currencies were depreciated (risking higher inflation due to a large share 
of imports in European economies) or government spending curtailed. 
However, while the United States argued that trade was the engine of 
growth, European governments identified investment as the key. Curtailing 
investment would not only have slowed growth but possibly caused labour 
unrest in Europe (Eichengreen 1996: 100-101). 
5.3. European monetary regionalism during the Bretton Woods era 
The return to convertibility of exchange rates in post-war Europe proved 
difficult, as the decision of one country to liberalise capital flows involved 
huge risks without the cooperation of other countries. These difficulties led 
to a realignment of European currencies. 
5.3.1 Sterling crisis and currency realignments in post-war Europe 
The British sterling had been much less overpriced in terms of inflation and 
war-related destruction of industrial capacity than the currencies of 
38 However, the subsequent US initiative for the establishment of an International Trade 
Organisation (ITO) failed since the US congress denied its approval. The Congress 
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Continental European countries. However, since Continental Europe 
maintained high tariffs and quantitative restrictions, the scope for export 
revenues that would support a convertible currency was limited. 
(Eichengreen 1996: 102-103). 
However, in 1947 the US insisted on Britain restoring current account and 
hence currency convertibility in exchange for a loan. Washington was 
anxious about imperial preference and keen to penetrate the markets of 
the UK and the Commonwealth. Further, the US saw British convertibility 
as an important step towards an open trading system. The effects were 
disastrous: The loan that had been allocated to last till the end of the 
decade was exhausted in a matter of weeks and convertibility suspended 
within a month with American consent (Eichengreen 1996: 103-104). 
Subsequently, the US accepted stretching out the transitional period of 
discrimination against trade and capital flows in Europe and mobilised 
huge capital aid (Marshall Plan). The problems were not limited to Britain 
as capital flight in France, Italy and Germany posed threats to political 
stability. Additionally, between 1948 and 1949 a recession in the US 
widened the European trade deficit. Consequently, in 1949 the sterling 
area had to devalue again and impose capital restrictions. Thirty additional 
countries, with the exception of Switzerland, Japan and some Latin 
American and Eastern European countries, had to devalue in response to 
the sterling crisis (Eichengreen 1996: 105-106). 
The devaluations had the desired effects. The end of the US recession 
and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 further eased the pressures 
on European current accounts. However, European trade deficits against 
the US remained severe while intra-European trade linkages kept low and 
required additional monetary measures (Eichengreen 1996: 106). 
The next chapter illustrates how the deficiencies of the Bretton Woods 
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5.3.2 The European Payment Union (EPU) 
The EPU was created in 1950, initially for two years, to deal with Europe's 
trade and payment problems but eventually lasted until 1958. The EPU 
resembled the Bretton Woods agreement on a regional level while 
consciously discriminating against the United States. The creation of EPU 
and its discriminatory mandate meant that the asymmetric system of 
Bretton Woods was officially acknowledged (Eichengreen 1996: 106-107). 
The EPU aimed at restoring current account convertibility39. Additionally, it 
entailed a credit device to adjust for balance of payment disequilibria. 
Polster argues that in that sense EPU was more than a means to achieve 
trade integration. It bore the potential for closer monetary integration 
(Polster 2002: 96). 
The US acceded to the discriminatory policies of the EPU, securing 
Western European support in the Cold War against the Soviet Union 
(Eichengreen 1996: 108). However, the potential for EPU to become a 
cornerstone of monetary integration split the US administration. Whereas 
the Treasury Department feared monetary emancipation of Western 
Europe from the IMF, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and 
the State Department saw European monetary integration as a potential 
force for a neo-capitalist new deal (Polster 2002: 99). 
The initial concept of EPU was inspired by the symmetrical Keynesian 
Clearing Union4o and aimed at a pooling of European currency reserves 
under a supranational umbrella. The trade surplus of creditor countries 
39 Convertibility meant enabling private transactions within the "real economy 
(commercial convertibility). It required import licensing in order to ensure that foreign 
exchange was used for that purpose. Pure capital transactions were certainly not 
allowed. Britain lobbied further for foreigner convertibility (foreigners being allowed to 
exchange foreign currency into Sterling), hoping to thereby strengthen the reserve 
currency position of the UK (Polster 2002: 108). 
40 However, this time the British administration was opposed to the idea of a 
supranational currency. Britain feared that the status of sterling as second most important 











Financial Power & Monetary Regionalism 
was to be compensated with gradually diminishing gold and dollar 
reserves while the deficits of debtor countries had to be paid with 
increasing amounts of gold and dollars. The remainder had to be financed 
through generous credits from the reserve pool and hence the creditor 
countries. 
However, the European countries were split into two camps based on their 
(presumptive) future creditor or debtor position (degrees of financial 
power). Belgium led the camp of potential creditors while the UK and 
Scandinavian countries defended the cause of debtors. Germany had 
been a debtor initially, but adjusted its position as soon as the country 
became a creditor (Polster 2002: 100-101). 
The German shift was astounding, since the country had only previously 
exhausted its quotas due to higher prices for imports of raw materials 
during the Korean War. According to the rules of EPU it would have had to 
leave the arrangement. However, the directorate of EPU, which had 
accrued fewer competencies than initially intended due to US reservations, 
managed an extraordinary rescue of the German economy. It allowed 
Germany to unilaterally re-impose trade restrictions and granted a credit 
by EPU. These measures helped Germany to surmount the crisis, and the 
country only then shifted to permanent surplus within EPU (Polster 2002: 
116; Eichengreen 1996: 110-111). 
The symmetrical concept did not succeed: The US, not the European 
countries, provided the capital for the credit mechanism. Creditors 
exceeding their quotas (15 per cent of 1949's trade volume) were 
compensated with constant non-diminishing amounts of gold and dollars. 
The mechanism was gradually revised in favour of creditor countries. 
Anyhow, the mechanism entailed an automatic credit to finance deficit 
countries' imports (the remainder not covered by dollars and gold). 
Absolute symmetry was unrealistic as some countries were creditors 
within Europe but in a debtor position towards the rest of the world. 
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surplus or deficit against the union as a whole and bilateral obligations 
ceased to exist (Polster 2002: 106-107). 
The EPU code of liberalisation mandated restoring convertibility of 
currencies for purposes of current account transactions. In 1951 all 
existing restrictions were to be equally applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner among EPU members, and they were to reduce their tariff levels 
gradually by one half and then by 75 per cent. When the EPU was 
terminated, credits amounting to over 3 billion US dollars were 
outstanding; equivalent to an increase in the Bretton woods quotas of 
nearly 50 per cent. (Eichengreen 1996: 107). 
The Bretton Woods institutions gradually lost relevance in comparison to 
the EPU. Europe had been the largest debtor of the World Bank in the first 
seven years of its existence. However, the World Bank's total European 
commitments amounted to only slightly more than five per cent of US aid 
commitments during the period of the Marshall Plan. IMF drawings were 
scarcoly larger during the same period and the Fund had acceded to US 
demands to withhold finance from countries that received Marshall Aid to 
ensure American control over European financial affairs (Eichengreen 
1996: 108). 
Democratisation and the consolidation of labour power prevented 
European countries from subordinating monetary sovereignty (interest rate 
policy) under external balance considerations as had been the case during 
the gold standard. Hence, the only instrument left to ensure balance of 
payments adjustment were exchange controls. These controls were 
rendered acceptable for EPU members, since they were subject to EPU 
approval and applied in a non-discriminatory manner across Western 
Europe (Eichengreen 1996: 110-111). 
However, despite the relative success and the weakening of the IMF, EPU 
did not become a device for closer monetary integration. Firstly, although 
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lagged behind. As a response to the crisis of integration, the group of six 
established the EEC. In 1955 the European Monetary Agreement 
substituted EPU. Secondly, the IMF began to relax its credit policy to 
debtor countries in order to regain ground lost to EPU (Polster 2002: 123). 
The next chapter illustrates the decay of the Bretton Woods financial 
system and the rise of financial globalisation. 
5.4 The demise of the Bretton Woods financial system 
The EPU contributed to Europe's economic recovery and, in interplay with 
US military expenditure and foreign aid, diminished the United States' 
surplus. In 1958 European countries had restored convertibility as laid 
down in Article VIII of the Bretton Woods agreement (Eichengreen 1996: 
113-114). 
However, a system of fixed exchange rates with free flows of capital and 
no exchange rate adjustments required credit to finance imbalances or 
restrictive monetary policies. Hence, weak-currency countries lobbied for 
more generous IMF quotas and additional international reserves while 
strong-currency countries objected to these demands (Eichengreen 1996: 
114). 
The Bretton Woods system had been designed asymmetrically with the 
US dollar being the lead currency providing international liquidity. 
Governments and central banks supplemented their gold reserves with US 
dollars and thereby added to US liabilities towards the rest of the world. 
This put pressure on the dollar-gold parity. The US could limit its liabilities 
by raising interest rates, thus making acquisition of the US dollar more 
expensive. One the other hand, a loose monetary policy provided more 
liquidity for the international markets. Either way the system relied on 
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The scarce currency clause providing foreign exchange for deficit 
countries had been designed to compensate these asymmetries. 
However, as the US consolidated its lead currency status, the system 
became ever more asymmetrical (Triffin Dilemma). The significant rise in 
global trade, the concerns of industrial countries about a future shortage of 
US dollars in the event of a US surplus, and developing countries' 
pressure enabled the agreement on special drawing rights (SDRs) (see 
Appendix VIII). 
By the time the US had achieved temporary payment surplus and SDRs 
were applied, dollar inflation had already gained ground with the 
development of oil-backed Euromarkets. The Triffin Dilemma persisted: 
The more the dollar became lead currency, the more speculations arose 
as to whether the United States could defend gold paritl1. (BMF 1977: 52; 
Eichengreen 1996: 117; 119-120). 
5.4.1 Trade integration and monetary disintegration 
Capital controls had a distinct impact on interest rate differentials and 
hence foreign exchange transactions (Eichengreen 1996: 121). The 
gradual removal of trade restrictions implied a loosening of capital controls 
(current-account convertibility) and contributed to the erosion of monetary 
sovereignty (Eichengreen 1996: 120-121). 
41 The French President De Gaulle had been a prominent critic of America's "exorbitant 
privilege" and threatened to liquidate French dollar reserves. The French position 
reflected that Paris never established itself as a financial centre comparable to London or 
New York and hence the franc never came close to being an international lead currency 
(with the exception of its regional position in the former colonies of West Africa) 
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Another important catalyst of financial globalisation was the development 
of Euromarkets. The convertibility of current accounts eased the 
acquisition of foreign exchange. However, the mounting pressures on the 
US dollar (e.g. due to inflation caused by increased military expenditure for 
the wars in Korea and Vietnam) forced the United States to apply an 
interest equalisation tax to keep the domestic interest rate level under 
control. Since foreign depositors already held considerable amounts of US 
currency abroad and capital controls at the U S border were less effective, 
Euromarkets took stage. Financial investors began to deposit US dollars in 
the City of London as they achieved higher interest there. Further, the 
dollar-dominated oil revenues from states within the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were increasingly recycled through 
London (BMF 1977: 26-27). 
When capital controls eroded, the only option to keep the Bretton Woods 
system going were currency realignments and restrictive monetary 
policies. However, monetary authorities rarely realigned currencies. 
Surplus countries feared the erosion of competitive advantage while deficit 
countries were concerned about information leaking from the IMF to 
financial investors (Eichengreen 1996: 122). The latter might have fuelled 
further destabilisation of exchange rates and thus bore the risk of 
overpricing imports and contributing to inflation. Instead, restrictive 
monetary policy required slowing growth and weakening the domestic 
social contract (which effectively happened after the Bretton Woods 
system had been abolished). 
5.4.2 The suspension of Bretton Woods 
During the Bretton Woods era the dollar-gold parity had to be adjusted 
several times in favour of gold. The US enforced selective capital controls, 
but opposed a more symmetrical financial system. Bretton Woods only 
survived for so long because monetary authorities cooperated (e.g. by 
pledging to refrain from converting dollars into gold or purchasing US 
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dollar and reluctantly stimulated merchandise imports, because the US 
threatened to disrupt the trade and monetary system and bore a 
disproportionate share of the defence burden (Eichengreen 1996: 128-
130; 135). 
However, there were limits to international cooperation. Countries with 
rising financial power such as Germany feared importing US inflation by 
backing the dollar. Germany realigned its currency only modestly to 
preserve the trade surplus. France, on the other hand, recalled the refusal 
of other countries to assist its own military ventures. The military 
undertakings in Southeast Asia were less important to Western Europe 
than protection by the NATO (Eichengreen 1996: 130-132; 135). 
In 1971 Germany, joined by the Netherlands, refused to intervene on 
behalf of the US dollar and allowed the Deutsche mark to float upwards. 
Speculations emerged about France and Britain converting dollars into 
gold. The Nixon administration in the US closed the gold window by 
suspending its commitment to provide gold to foreign dollar holders and 
imposed a 10 per cent surcharge on merchandise imports to pressure 
other countries to realign their currencies. These developments motivated 
the Smithsonian agreement and the revaluation of the yen, the Swiss 
franc, the Deutsche mark and the Benelux currencies (Eichengreen 1996: 
133). 
US corporate competitiveness was restored, but the underlying 
fundamentals remained unchanged. Britain also faced inflationary 
pressures as the fragmented union movement hindered collective wage 
bargaining, and the governments did not wish to apply restrictive monetary 
policies. Sterling was the second most important reserve currency and the 
psychological line of defence for the US dollar. In 1972 Britain floated the 
sterling outside its Smithsonian band. The dollar was devalued once again 
by 10 per cent and by a larger margin against the yen. However, capital 
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currencies upward. The Bretton Woods financial system (albeit never 
officially suspended) ceased to exist (Eichengreen 1996: 125; 134). 
In sum, Eichengreen argues that four lessons could be drawn from the 
period of Bretton Woods: Firstly, capital liberalisation complicates 
exchange rate policy. Secondly, the hegemonic financial system and 
monetary cooperation required a political alliance between the United 
States, Western Europe and Japan. Thirdly, a cooperative monetary 
system will work most efficiently if it belongs to an interlocking web of 
political and economic bargains. Fourthly, if relative power and political 
objectives of the states involved change, cooperation may run up against 
binding limits (Eichengreen 1996: 135). 
The following chapter argues that the same holds true for European 
monetary regionalism. 
6. European monetary integration in the post-Bretton Woods era 
In 1962 the Commission of the European Community drafted a first plan 
for a fully-fledged monetary union to be achieved within nine years. The 
sole accomplishment of that initiative was the committee of central bank 
governors, which did not develop an operational role until the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods financial system. (Eichengreen 1993: 1323). 
Two important developments spurred later European monetary integration: 
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods financial system and the Single 
European Act (SEA). As intra-European exchange rates were effectively 
pegged by their parity commitment to the US Dollar, pressure for 
exchange rate coordination had been minimal during the Bretton Woods 
era. Once the crisis of Bretton Woods became tangible, these pressures 
intensified. The SEA finalised a truly internal market for commodities, 
capital and (with some limitations) labour by 1992 (Eichengreen 1993: 
1324). Eichengreen argues that trade integration did not necessarily 
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could potentially exacerbate huge exchange rate swings, floating 
exchange rates bore the risk of intensifying opposition to the single 
market. He suggests that only in that political sense was monetary 
unification a necessary corollary of trade integration (Eichengreen 1993: 
1322-1323; 1327-1331). 
The various initiatives towards EMU42 differ markedly in respect to the 
regulation of capital flows and the concept of European economic 
governance. They illustrate the change of political concepts and relative 
power that occurred within the EU since the end of Bretton Woods. 
(Eichengreen 1993: 1323). 
The Hague summit in 1969 appOinted a committee, chaired by the then 
Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, which recommended 
monetary union within ten years (Werner Plan). The Werner Plan was in 
many respects the most ambitious and symmetrical initiative towards 
EMU. It envisioned three stages: The first stage recommended limiting 
exchange rate fluctuations and coordinating fiscal and monetary policies. 
The second stage called for a further reduction of exchange rate variability 
and a narrowing of price divergences. The third stage proposed 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates and the removal of capital controls. An 
EC system of central banks (comparable to the US Federal Reserve 
System) would take control of monetary policies in the member countries. 
The size of the EU budget would be dramatically increased and fiscal 
policies would be coordinated. However, the Plan did not recommend a 
monetary union, but suggested that both options (fixed exchange rates or 
single currency) were viable (Eichengreen 1993: 1323). 
Elements of that report were implemented in 1972 when EC countries 
introduced a mechanism commonly labelled the snake. The latter limited 
42 The dissertation will only portray the most relevant initiatives, ignoring some of the 
transitional developments that were only technically relevant, such as the European 
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bilateral exchange rate movements to 2 'Y.! per cent bands. However, 
policy coordination lagged behind. The first OPEC oil shock hit the 
European countries asymmetrically (an expression of unequal financial 
power and different social contracts among the EC members), resulting in 
varying degrees of mass unemployment and contradictory policy 
responses. The oil price shock led to wider revaluations of currencies than 
intended under the snake and some countries left the mechanism 
temporarily or even permanently (Eichengreen 1993: 1323). 
These developments led to the exchange rate mechanism negotiated at 
the Bremen summit in 1978: the European Monetary System (EMS). The 
EMS was less ambitious than the Werner Plan. It sacrificed the idea of 
policy coordination and allowed different exchange rate bands for EC 
countries within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as well as currency 
realignments in response to balance of payment disequilibria. Selective 
controls were permitted on capital account transactions (Eichengreen 
1993: 1323-1324). 
In 1986 the EC members initiated the SEA, committing themselves to an 
integrated market with free movement of commodities, capital and labour. 
The initiative was a (microeconomic) response to integration setbacks and 
the limitations of macroeconomic policies in a global self-help regime. 
Thus the SEA was a decisive turning point towards institutionalised neo-
liberalism in Europe. In 1988 it led the European Council to appoint a 
committee, chaired by Jaques Delors, then President of the European 
Commission, to evaluate the prospects of monetary union (De/ors Report). 
The recommendations of the Delors Report were published in 1989 and 
provided the framework for intergovernmental negotiations in 1991. The 
Maastricht Treaty incorporated many of the conclusions from that report 
(Eichengreen 1993: 1324). 
The Treaty of Maastricht amended the European primary law embodied in 
the Treaty of Rome. Capitalising upon the Delors Report, it described a 
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Stage one implied the removal of capital controls (to a large extent 
achieved in 1990), the reduction of inflation and interest rate differentials 
and stabilising intra-European exchange rates. Further, member countries 
had to strengthen central bank independence and bring domestic laws into 
conformance with the Treaty. However, convergence of inflation and 
interest rates proved difficult. A foreign-exchange market crisis in 1992 led 
to the emergency application of selective capital controls (Eichengreen 
1993: 1326). 
Stage two started in 1994 and was characterised by further convergence 
of economic indicators as well as the creation of the European Monetary 
Institute (EM I}. EMI had to coordinate member countries' monetary 
policies in the transitional period of EMU. If the Council of Ministers 
decided by qualified majority that most countries met the criteria for 
monetary union, it could recommend to the Heads of States to inaugurate 
stage three (also by qualified majority), thereby intensifying pressures on 
the "underachievers,,43. 
Stage three could have proceeded with a minority of EC countries. It fixed 
exchange rates irrevocably and substituted EMI with the ECB assuming 
control of the monetary policies of the partiCipating countries. The Council 
of Ministers would decide when to replace national currencies by a single 
currency (Eichengreen 1993: 1326). 
The single currency euro was introduced in 1999 (as mere transaction 
currency) in eleven member countries and as physical money throughout 
2002. It is currently the official currency or anchor currency in 22 countries, 
of which 16 are members of the EU (European Union 2008). 
43 The Treaty required the EC Heads of States to meet no later than by the end of 1996 to 
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The initiatives for EMU highlight distinct conceptual approaches towards 
monetary unification. The Maastricht Treaty and the Delors Report 
resembled the Werner Plan in that they intended to achieve monetary 
union in less than a decade, stressed the need for fiscal harmonisation 
and described transition in three stages. However, they also differed in 
several ways: 
The Werner Plan saw capital liberalisation at the end of monetary 
unification while the Delors Report started with liberalising capital flows. 
Further, the Delors Report did not propose transferring fiscal sovereignty 
to the EC but developed guidelines to monitor "fiscal discipline" and 
exclude access of member countries to central bank credit. 
The Delors Report recommended monetary centralisation, transferring 
national central banks into operational branches of the ECB. The Werner 
Plan had allowed for mere monetary coordination instead. Finally, the 
Delors Report stressed the priority of price stability by monetary means (2 
per cent inflation target). It subordinated other goals of economic policies, 
such as growth and employment, to price stability (Eichengreen 1993: 
1324-1325). 
6.1. The road to European Monetary Union (EMU) 
The following chapters will outline the stages towards EMU in more detail 
and portray the national policies involved. The developments after the 
Maastricht Treaty will be ignored. Up to now only minor adjustments to that 
treaty have been pursued44 . It remains the cumulative stage of EMU. 
Neither the Treaty of Amsterdam, nor the failed TEC or the Treaty of 
the end of 1997 no date had been set, stage three automatically would have commenced 
in 1999 (Eichengreen 1993: 1326). 
44 For example, allowing for slightly more flexibility with respect to budget deficits in case 
of negative growth (Council of the European Union 2005). However, such adjustments 
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Lisbon (yet to be ratified by all EU member states) introduced significant 
changes to the Maastricht concept. 
6.1.1 The Snake 
The crisis of Bretton Woods and the inadequacy of the European 
Monetary Agreement (EMA) from 1958 to ensure further economic and 
political integration forced European countries to reconsider an exchange 
rate mechanism. As the Smithsonian Agreement had allowed for currency 
fluctuations within a band of (plus/minus) 2 Y4 against the dollar, European 
currencies could theoretically fluctuate within a band of 9 per cent and 
hence threaten closer integration. Despite the shortcomings of Bretton 
Woods, countries with little financial power continued to lobby for regulated 
exchange rate policies while countries with considerable financial power 
such as Germany tended towards floating exchange rates (Polster 2002: 
164-166). 
In 1972 the central banks of the group of six belonging to the EEC agreed 
in Basel to limit fluctuations to 2 Y4 per cent respectively (a larger band 
than regulated by the initial provisions of Bretton Woods) and introduced 
short-term financing for deficit countries. The European countries still 
adhered to the Bretton Woods agreement fixing the parity to the Dollar. 
Hence, the Basel Accord has been dubbed the "snake (European band) in 
the tunnel" (Dollar parity). In 1973 the "snake left the tunnel" when 
European countries began to float their currencies en bloc (Polster 2002: 
166). Denmark, Ireland and the UK (which joined the EC in 1973) as well 
as Norway and Sweden agreed to participate in the snake (Eichengreen 
1996: 154). 
The snake introduced an autonomous intervention mechanism. It 
obligated both creditor and debtor countries to intervene with unlimited 
amounts of European currencies to defend the band, but only within a 
short time frame. However, the balancing would occur in the creditor 
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discount rate of the countries involved. Hence, it laid the burden of the 
parity commitment on the debtor country. A European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund (EMCF) initially administered the interventions on the 
basis of a European Currency Unit (ECU)4s Its practical relevance fell 
short of the initial plans (pooling of reserves, supranational decision-
making body) (polster 2002: 166-167). 
The prospects of the snake remained unclear, as the 1969 plans for 
monetary union had not yet failed. The process towards EMU finally 
stalled over a controversy among French "monetarists,,46 and German 
"economists". The latter argued that a political union should precede 
monetary integration while the monetarists pressured for supranational 
monetary institutionalisation (Polster 2002: 167-168).47 The controversy 
was revealing with regard to the interplay of financial power and broader 
political priorities of the countries involved: The smaller Benelux countries 
Belgium and Luxemburg (who had pursued a bilateral monetary union 
since 1946) and the European Commission sided with France while the 
Netherlands and, to a certain extent, Italy sided with Germany. On first 
sight it is not obvious why Italy, a country that then had the highest rates of 
inflation and the weakest currency among the EC members, joined the 
economists. It appears that Italy tried to capitalise on its historical relations 
with Germany and maintain a flexible approach to monetary integration, 
since the negotiations over regional structural funds began to gain 
momentum (Polster 2002: 314). 
45 To be later replaced by the European Currency Accounting Unit (Polster 2002: 167). 
46 The term should not be confused with monetarism. To the contrary, the French 
monetarists strongly argued in favour of discretionary monetary policies. 
47 Ironically, today the dominant positions in the two countries have shifted with German 
policy makers strongly arguing against complementing the monetary union by economic 
governance (see chapter 6.2). However, the German reservations of that time were 
presumably of a tactical nature in order to avoid deeper monetary integration. 
Conversely, the French administration has been quite reluctant to complement 
intergovernmental economic governance by strengthening the role of the European 
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The OPEC oil price shock affected all European countries participating in 
the snake. However, different degrees of financial power, oil dependency 
and stability of the domestic social contracts affected the participants 
asymmetrically. Germany targeted monetary aggregates aggressively and 
established the Deutsche mark as unchallenged regional lead currency 
while France adopted expansionary fiscal policies. The supranational 
capacities for coordinating the economic policies within the EC as 
recommended by the Werner Plan remained totally underdeveloped 
(Eichengreen 1996: 155; 159). At the end of the 1970s the snake was 
reduced to a small bloc of hard currency countries, namely Germany, the 
three Benelux states and Norway (Bofinger & Flassbeck 2000: 5). As from 
1976 France withdrew from the snake entirely. However, speculative 
capital flows and erratic exchange rates reduced the support for floating 
even in Germany (Eichengreen 1996: 159). 
Consequently, a renewed impetus for EMU had to address the French 
concern for a more institutionalised approach and the German priority on 
fighting inflation (Polster 2002: 169). The subsequent EMS satisfied these 
criteria. 
6.1.2 From the European Monetary System (EMS) to monetary union 
Formally, the EMS was a symmetrical agreement strengthening the 
oversight powers of the Monetary Committee of the EC and authorising 
governments to draw unlimited credits from the very short-term financing 
facility (VSTF) (Eichengreen 1996: 160). 
The French initiative for deeper monetary regionalism depended on the 
German support by then chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Schmidt saw the 
creation of the EMS as a political tool to realign France with the EC after it 
withdrew from the snake and to insulate the German economy from the 
depreciating dollar. (Eichengreen 1996: 161). Hence, closer monetary 
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The Schmidt-Giscard initiative sought the European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
to manage the combined foreign-exchange reserves, intervene in currency 
markets and to create the European Currency Unit (ECU) as European 
SDR. The EMF replaced the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(Eichengreen 1996: 161). 
The Bundesbank Council was concerned that the EMF might create 
unbacked ECU reserves in favour of deficit countries and hence 
undermine price stability. It therefore objected to the Schmidt-Giscard 
initiative. Consequently, the French and the German governments 
retreated from transferring national foreign exchange to the EMF. The 
Bundesbank reserved itself the right to opt out of its intervention obligation 
if the European countries failed to realign their currencies (Eichengreen 
1996: 162). The participating countries agreed on the EMS in 1978. The 
EMS was based on an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) holding 
currencies within a (+/-) 2Y..-percentage band (for the Italian lira of 6 per 
cent respectively) similar to the provisions in the final years of Bretton 
Woods. It allowed for capital controls and currency realignments 
(Eichengreen 1996: 163). 
The formal symmetry of the EMS implied that when a currency A reached 
its upper intervention point vis-a-vis currency B (i.e. it depreciated), 
currency B reached its lower intervention point obligating both central 
banks to intervene on the currency markets. In practice the system was 
not symmetric, because it was conducted on a bilateral basis and the 
VSTF credit had to be repaid by the weak currency country, effectively 
imposing a budget constraint. Further, the ECU's role remained limited as 
realignments were conducted on a bilateral basis. The informal indicator of 
divergence complemented the parity grid and obligated countries to 
intervene if their currency deviated from the average of all other 
currencies. Thereby also strong currency countries would have been 
forced to adjust. However, the indicator of divergence remained a purely 
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6.1.2.1 The early years of the EMS 
In its first four years the EMS was doomed by a global recession 
aggravated by monetarist economic policies in the US and Europe. The 
recession magnified policy divergences. The new French Socialist 
government led by Francois Mitterrand initiated expansionary policies. The 
policies were quite successful in terms of stabilising growth and 
employment. However, the Bundesbank raised interest rates, provoking 
capital flight from Germany to France. However, the French government 
refused to devalue the franc, reflecting its desire to strengthen the role of 
the currency as an international reserve currency and its unwillingness to 
stigmatise the new government domestically. Finally, the French 
government scaled back its policies of demand-stimulus and devalued the 
Franc in order to avoid a French exit from the EMS. The latter could have 
implied a withdrawal from the EC since huge exchange rate variations 
potentially undermined the CAP with fixed prices for agricultural products 
(Eichengreen 1996: 165-166; Bofinger & Flassbeck 2000: 3). The French 
policy shift was a turning point for Germany's policy makers' attitude 
towards EMU (Polster 2002: 420). Exchange rate adjustments became 
less frequent at the end of the 1980s as the gradual relaxation of capital 
controls complicated orderly realignments (Eichengreen 1996: 165). 
The macroeconomic constraints imposed on countries with little financial 
power, high unemployment rates and a depreciating US dollar encouraged 
European policy makers to ensure global competitiveness through 
microeconomic reforms of the labour market and social security systems. 
The initiative for the SEA accelerated monetary integration. The 
elimination of currency conversion costs and the abolishment of the 
opportunity for competitive devaluation were seen as a mechanism to 
defuse protectionist opposition to trade liberalisation (Eichengreen 1996: 
168). In 1988 the Franco-German Security and Defence Council as well as 
the Economic and Financial Council were established (Polster 2002: 339). 
These seemingly unrelated areas were to define the Franco-German 
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Maastricht Treaty stipulated the need for a single currency to finalise a 
truly internal market. The Delors Report implied major conceptual shifts in 
monetary integration. It recommended the liberalisation of capital flows as 
a prerequisite, not a consequence of monetary unification (Eichengreen 
1996: 168). 
Interestingly, the German Minister of Finance welcomed the initiative, 
whereas the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was 
critical. He proposed a trade-off between a monetary union and closer 
political integration that would assist Germany in conSOlidating its political 
sovereignty (Eichengreen 1996: 169). Subsequently, France acceded to 
German reunification in exchange for a German commitment to EMU. 
Germany accepted the irreversibility of monetary union in exchange for the 
ECB adopting the monetary concepts of the Bundesbank. Finally, France 
too agreed to closer political integration as a means to hedge against 
German policy after Germany's reunification in 1990. Reunification 
promised a huge increase in Germany's political sovereignty and the 
penetration of Eastern European markets by German exports. Hence, the 
consensus for EMU can be understood as a trade-off between Germany's 
desire for greater political sovereignty (both national sovereignty and 
within the EU's framework) and the French pursuit of monetary 
regionalism. (Polster 2002: 339-341). 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 brought huge institutional changes to the 
EU with implications for foreign and monetary policies. In monetary affairs 
the Treaty of Maastricht set the stage for liberalising capital flows and 
irrevocably triggering EMU. Further; the treaty established four 
convergence criteria for EC member countries that wished to introduce the 
single currency: Firstly, the country was obligated to hold its currency 
within the ERM fluctuation bands for at least two years. Secondly, for the 
preceding twelve months it had to keep inflation within the range of 1.5 per 
cent above the rates in the three lowest-inflation member states. Thirdly, 
the public debt and deficit ratio to GDP had to be kept within a 60 and 3 
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maintain a nominal long-term interest rate that did not exceed the rates in 
the three lowest-inflation member states by more than 2 per cent 
(Eichengreen 1996: 171). While stabilising exchange rates, converging 
price levels and narrowing interest rate differentials had been clearly a 
prerequisite for an orderly monetary union, the adequacy of the fiscal 
provisions and the levels at which exchange rates were finally fixed were 
disputed. From the perspective of low inflation countries these provisions 
were the price countries with less financial power had to pay to reap the 
benefits of a hard currency. 
6.1.2.2 The EMS crisis 
The intergovernmental conference of Maastricht had been concluded in 
December 1991 after the EMS had endured a period of stability with no 
exchange rate adjustments of ERM currencies for five years. All member 
states of the EC except Greece and Portugal were participating. The 
stability could be maintained despite major economic challenges: The 
collapse of the Soviet Union affected European economies such as 
Finland that heavily exported to the East. The aid for Eastern European 
economies strained structural funds and cohesion programmes within the 
EC. Finally, Western Germany's economic and monetary unification with 
the GDR (with a highly disputed currency conversion ratio at par) led to 
budget deficits, capital imports and continent-wide upward pressure on 
interest rates. However, the US dollar depreciated further against the 
Deutsche mark and other ERM currencies. It aggravated one of Europe's 
deepest recessions after WW II. Despite these obstacles, no exchange 
rate realignments were conducted. Also countries outside the EMS -
except Finland - speculating on joining the arrangement (Austria, Norway 
and Sweden) kept their exchange rates stable. 
The turning point came with the Danish referendum in June 1992 rejecting 
the Maastricht Treaty and the approach of the French referendum in 
September of the same year. The markets subsequently tested the 
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narrow band (which Italy had applied in 1990). The currencies that 
operated within a wide band (British sterling, Spanish peseta and 
Portuguese escudo) weakened considerably. The sterling fell to its floor, 
the lira fell through it subsequently and the Finish markka's unilateral ECU 
peg was abandoned. The pressure on the Swedish krona intensified, 
forcing the Riksbank to raise interest rates. A devaluation of the lira (widely 
considered as being too small) and a revaluation of other ERM currencies 
of 3.5 per cent intensified speculations over the stability of the EMS. 
Additional pressures mounted on Britain, Spain, Portugal and Italy, forcing 
interventions, interest-rate increases, and depleting reserves. Britain 
suspended its ERM membership in September and Italy floated the lira 
(Eichengreen 1996: 172-173). 
The British and Italian exit from the ERM had contagious effects. France, 
Denmark and Ireland came under speculative attacks by financial 
investors despite the French electorate confirming the Maastricht Treaty 
and economic fundamentals that did not justify exchange rate 
realignments. Spain, Portugal and Ireland had to re-impose capital 
controls. Sweden subsequently abandoned its unilateral ECU peg (later to 
be followed by Norway) while Spain and Portugal had to devalue their 
currencies. The French franc could be successfully defended while 
I reland's removal of capital controls in 1993 pushed I rish market rates to 
triple-digit levels (Eichengreen 1996: 173-174). 
The Danish electorate endorsed the Maastricht Treaty in a second 
referendum and the Bundesbank lowered interest rates. Subsequently, the 
French franc and other weak ERM currencies stabilised. However, French 
inflation ran below German inflation. French policy-makers speculated that 
the franc had assumed a lead currency status and pressured the Banque 
de France (BDF) for interest rate cuts to fight unemployment. However, 
the German government refused to equally lower interest rates and to 
coordinate monetary policy with France, pushing the franc again towards 
its ERM floor, making bilateral intervention necessary. The Belgian franc 
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1993 an ad hoc meeting of ministers and central bankers was called 
(before an impending reopening of the Tokyo stock exchange) to manage 
the crisis. The French government refused to further devalue the franc, a 
group of countries opposed general realignment of ERM currencies, the 
Dutch vetoed a floating of the Deutsche mark (which served as an anchor 
for the Netherlands) and a Belgian proposal for tighter deposit 
requirements on banks' open foreign currency positions (effectively limiting 
financial speculation) was vetoed. The disagreement led to a huge 
widening of the ERM band to 15 per cent (Eichengreen 1996: 174-175). 
Managed floating was back. 
The sources of the EMS crisis are the subject of an intense debate. Some 
observers argue that the move of the UK, Italy and Spain towards the hard 
EMS was premature, since inflation differentials were too high48 . However, 
quantitative data suggests that only Italy (and Germany in the period after 
reunification) endured a significant rise in unit labour costs. Further, 
currencies moved suddenly to the edges of the ERM bands with no 
indication of a gradual decline of investors' confidence (Eichengreen 1996: 
176-177). 
Another explanation features expectations of future policy shifts in light of 
Germany's brief period of inflation. As the Bundesbank obviously rejected 
continuing inflation in Germany, the adjustment had to be borne by the 
other ERM countries slowing inflation. Hence, investors would have tested 
the commitment of countries with high unemployment and weak 
governments after the Danish electorate refused the Maastricht Treaty. 
48 Peter Bofinger and Flassbeck argue that Germany's restrictive monetary approach and 
Italy's reckless policy errors triggered the crisis. The lira would have been considered a 
more stable currency after having joined the narrow band, hence reducing the currency's 
risk-premium. Italy would have set interest rates too high to follow the German lead while 
the inflation differential remained considerable. The subsequent inflow of hot short-term 
capital anticipated a subsequent outflow. Hence, Italy should have narrowed the band 
only after disinflation policies would have reduced inflation diferentials. Further, the asset 
settlement obligation of the VSTF should have been suspended temporarily during the 
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But if the fear of an expansionary policy shift drove (rational) investors' 
behaviour, it should have been reflected in forward rates of ERM 
currencies immediately after the referendum (currencies appreciating 
signalling a future depreciation). However, the only currencies that fell out 
of their band prior to September 1993 were the lira and the Danish krone 
(Eichengreen 1996: 179). 
Eichengreen suggests that financial investors capitalised on the Danish 
blow to Maastricht by pursuing a self-fulfilling prophecy. One country's 
rejection of austerity policy would have raised the political price of 
defending parities in other countries with sound economic fundamentals. 
Hence, investors would have simply speculated that after the Danish 
referendum domestic policy makers were less capable of ensuring support 
for the Maastricht Treaty once their currency was under attack. 
(Eichengreen 1996: 180-181). However, the relaxation of capital flows 
clearly invited investors to test states' capacities versus markets. 
6.1.2.3 The implementation of the Euro 
The ECU exchange rates were frozen on 31 December 1998 at market 
rates establishing the value of the euro (substituting the ECU at par). The 
euro became the accounting currency of participating countries and was 
gradually introduced in 2002. Currently, it is the official currency in 16 of 
27 EU member states. The eurozone comprises: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. The currency is also 
used in five countries and territories on the basis of a formal agreement 
and in six other countries that adopted the Euro unilaterally 
(Nationalbanken 2009). 
ERM II replaced the original ERM in 1999. The Greek and Danish 
currencies were part of the new mechanism. However, Greece joined the 
euro in 2001. ERM II keeps the band for currency fluctuations against the 
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the exchange rate of the krone within a narrower range of 2 X per cent on 
either side (Nationalbanken 2009). 
Chapter 6.2 will briefly illustrate current tensions within the eurozone. 
Chapter 6.3 will propose a relationship between financial power and 
national attitudes to EMU. 
6.2. Conflicts in the eurozone 
European monetary unification has intensified the debate about German 
mercantilism and economic governance in Europe ('Are German Workers 
Killing Europe' 2006). 
Government bond yields in Europe had sufficiently converged and inflation 
has been reduced significantly by means of monetary and fiscal measures 
(Goodhardt 2007: 97). However, trade patterns within the EU are highly 
unbalanced, with Germany being a prominent surplus country, reversing 
the conversion process49 . Germany has increased its trade surplus since 
1999 significantly while considerably slowing the growth of its domestic 
economy by further undercutting the inflation rates of its EMU partner 
countries (see Table 3 & 4) (Flassbeck & Spiecker 2005; Herr & 
Kazandziska 2007: 141). 
49 The current economic crisis has significantly widened bond yields on government debt 
again. The lack of bail-out provisions or ECB financing for countries facing state 
insolvency has fed into existing divergences, provoking speculations over dissolving the 
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EMU member countries, the advantage of lower real interest rates will 
cease to exist. However, the competitive gap in pricing goods and services 
accumulated in previous years will persist (Flassbeck & Spiecker 2005: 
707). Further, an adequate interest rate policy becomes impossible if price 
levels diverge too much as the ECB has to consider the economic 
situation of the whole union. Therefore, interest rates will be too high in 
some countries and too low in others. 
Unequal trade patterns exist across regions in most currency areas of the 
world. However, the eurozone differs markedly from a single political entity 
with central or federal governance based on citizenship and democratic 
legitimacy (Eichengreen 1993: 1321-1322). Further, economic imbalances 
across regions can provoke political tensions even within nation states, as 
witnessed between Western and Eastern Germany or the North and South 
of Italy. 
German mercantilism has provoked high-level political reactions from 
France and other EMU partner countries ('Merkel's lack of resolve poses 
risk to Germany' 2008). The perspective of the beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy for a country with a huge internal market such as Germany remains 
unclear. Either deficit countries have to be alimented with structural funds, 
(while growth of the domestic economy in Germany remains low) or the 
currency union has to dissolve. 
The current economic crisis has again underscored the beggar-thy-
neighbour approach of the German government. Germany refused to take 
appropriate fiscal measures and thereby address unequal trade patterns 
within the EU and versus the US economy. Apparently, Germany 
speculates on a free ride on fiscal programmes of neighbouring countries 
(Hutton 2008). 
Hence, pressures to strengthen the soft economic coordination in Europe 
beyond the deflationary implications of the Maastricht Treaty will probably 
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Oskar Lafontaine, and his French counterpart, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 
initiated the Cologne Process in 1999 (Heise 2008). The Cologne Process 
aimed at strengthening European economic governance but degraded to a 
mere consultative mechanism after Lafontaine resigned over 
disagreements with then German chancellor Gerhard Schroder. However, 
the French President Nicholas Sarkozy has repeatedly called for European 
economic governance coordinating monetary, fiscal and wage policies 
during the current economic crisis (European Parliament 2008). 
6.3 European Monetary Union (EMU) and national preferences 
The previous chapters on the history of EMU highlighted national 
approaches to monetary regionalism. The current chapter tests whether 
financial power coincides with these patterns of monetary integration 
policies. 
Table 4 proposes a monetary hierarchy of EU member countries based on 
their relative degrees of financial power. A higher positive score indicates 
more financial power. The corresponding data is given in Table 5 and 
Table 6. 
The comparison ignores latecomers and specific cases of EMU member 
countries as indicated in the introduction to the thesis. In consequence, 
eight EMU member countries will be analysed: Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The 
indicators for measuring financial power are the trade balance, openness 
to trade, inflation rates and the status of the currency as international 
reserve currency. Interest rate policy is being ignored as countries with 
financial power do not necessarily utilise that power. The strength of the 
social contract is likewise excluded from the quantitative section, since it 
involves several conceptual problems as discussed in chapter 3. 
Relative financial power is measured on a simple ordinal basis. A score of 
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average financial power and a score of - 1 with less than average financial 
power with respect to the specific indicator. The indicators are unweighted. 
It is not possible to determine within the scope of the present dissertation 
whether one specific indicator (e.g., the status as international reserve 
currency) bears more importance than the other indicators utilised. Hence, 
the empirical evidence serves mainly to test the hypothesis developed in 
the theoretical section. So far, no general empirical concept has been 
established in relevant literature to measure financial power. 
Indicators of financial power 
Lower inflation broadens the scope for expansionary monetary policy and 
is therefore associated with more financial power. Openness to trade 
(more than the average of EMU countries) is associated with less financial 
power. Open economies are more vulnerable to exchange rate 
movements and depend on price stability in order to maintain a positive 
trade balance A positive trade balance (with respect to EU non-EMU 
countries) instead will be associated with more financial power. 50 A surplus 
in the trade balance reflects lower relative prices in comparison with trade 
partners and a creditor position in the balance of payments, and raises 
demand for the domestic currency as a medium of transaction (status as 
international reserve currency). These factors broaden the scope of 
monetary policy as discussed in chapter 3. he status as international 
reserve currency reflects and supports investors' willingness to utilise a 
currency in international transactions and as a store of value, hence 
relaxing external constraints on monetary policy. The status of a currency 
before the introduction of the common currency will be defined according 
50 It should be noted that trade patterns also depend on specialisation, the overall 
structure of the economy and its geographical location. Further, some countries might run 
a trade surplus with EU members but a trade deficit with the rest of the world and vice 
versa. However, since EU member countries operate within a common market and peg 
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to the international reserve currency composition (IMF 2008). However, 
only three European currencies could be considered as relevant 
international reserve currencies: The Deutsche mark, the French franc and 
the Dutch guilder. 





























































Table 6 and Table 7 present the aggregated data utilised in Table 5. Table 
5 provides the average inflation rates and the average quota of trade to 
GDP within the concerned period. Table 7 provides each concerned 
country's trade balance with the rest of the EU over the given period.52 
51 Inflation: 1 = lower than average of countries; -1 = higher than average of countries; 
Intemal Market: 1 = trade to GDP lower than average of countries; -1 = trade to GDP 
higher than average of countries; Intra-European Trade Pattem: 1 = positive trade 
balance with the rest of EU in majority of years; -1 = negative trade balance with the rest 
of EU in majority of years; Status as Intemational Reserve Currency: 
1 = important intemational reserve currency of IMF; 0 = moderate importance as 
international reserve currency of IMF; -1 = no importance as international reserve 
currency of IMF 
52 The data in Table 6 is limited to the period since 1992. Only since then has common 
statistical data been available for reunified Germany. The data in Table 7 is limited to the 
period since 1999, when national currencies were abolished and could no longer distort 
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Table 6: Inflation and Trade Openness (approximated averages for 
period 1992-2006)53 
Source: World Bank Database; own calculations 
Country Inflation Trade to GOP 
Netherlands 2.05% 111.52 % 
Luxembourg 2.11 % 241.47 % 
Belgium 1,99 % 149,17 % 
Germany 2,00% 60,25 % 
Spain 3,51 % 49,02 % 
Portugal 3,76% 64,55 % 
France 1,68 % 49,21 % 
Italy 3,02% 47,72 % 
All Countries 2,52 % 96, 16 % 
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Tabie 5 connmlS the broad assumptions all Ilatiolwl mon"I~(Y integration 
pdicies stipulated in c/wpre,. 2.3. However, they nMe to be e.p amed 1n 
wnjut1Ction -Mlh bfoade.- politiCal Qoal._ Monetary hierarchies do dearly 
exist even within regional country groupmgs furtoor, countries from an 
intra-ELJfopean regIOn w,th more finar";lal power mdY possess less 
finaocial powe.- than a stronger country 110m d reg1O<l with avemll weak 
flnaocial power. Consequently. the inib,,1 research hypothesis and the 
pror:<Jsed patterns 01 nahonal integratIOn r:dicies tk3ve to be further 
different lilted with respect to the previous Gase sllJdy and the monetary 
I~e<afchy developed 011 Table 5 
Germany is a clear-cut caSe of a country with pWrIOUnced financial power 
and only gradually recovering poIilical sovereignly, Ever sInce Germdny 
shiJted to\,idrds being a surpus cOlJl1try and established Itself as monetary 
leader in Europe with a strong domestic soc'l a; contract, it featured d rdther 
Unilateral approach to monetary integrahon Although Germany welcom~d 
closer poIltlcallntegmtiOll in the domdin of foreign policy, it WaS reluctant 
to accede 10 mor.etmy integration , Gefnlany orj y gradually gave up 
oppositIOn to EMU, The Ge,man reunification and tr...s ,ts consoiiddtion of 
politic .. sa,ereignty . dS """It as the French po licy shift after Ihe Keyr.eslan 
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EMU. Hence, trade integration and broader political goals clearly played a 
decisive role in Germany favouring monetary integration. 
France possessed greater regional autonomy over its foreign policy but 
less financial power than Germany. It featured a rather multilateral 
approach to monetary integration, at the same time trying to limit the role 
of parliamentary control over intergovernmental bargains. France's rather 
closed economy reaffirms its policy stance. When French policy-makers 
sought to assume a lead currency role for the franc in the aftermath of 
Germany's inflationary episode (reunification), they continued lowering 
interest rates. Hence, a potential French financial leadership would have 
been entirely different from Germany, which pursued a rather restrictive 
monetary policy despite its well-positioned currency. The French approach 
perfectly fits the French attitude towards the lead currency role of the US 
dollar during the Bretton Woods era and France's relatively closed 
economy (see Table 6). Hence, trade integration played a minor role for 
France in pursuing EMU while increased financial power explains its 
motives best. 
The Benelux countries differed according to their monetary status. They 
pursued a rather federalist approach to political integration compensating 
for their relative weaker bargaining power in comparison with the regional 
hegemons Germany and France. Belgium and even more so Luxembourg 
possess little financial power. Hence, these two countries followed a 
multilateral approach to monetary integration. The Netherlands, while also 
lobbying for a multilateral political design of the European project, followed 
the German lead in monetary affairs. The country had shifted towards 
highly centralised wage bargaining after an inflationary bubble in the 
1970s and huge unemployment rates. It thereby successfully moderated 
wage increase below the German level, reflecting lower productivity and 
strong trade ties with Germany (Bofinger & Flassbeck 2000: 24; Noordman 
1995). Hence, the Netherlands possessed more financial power than their 
Benelux counterparts. In sum, the benefits of trade integration clearly 
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the monetary approach differed according to their respective financial 
power. 
The Southern-Mediterranean countries have been less exposed in the 
previous analysis as only Italy joined the EC early enough to have a 
meaningful influence on monetary regionalism. These countries 
possessed smaller financial power. Italy plays an exceptional role. It 
possesses little overall financial power (comparable to Belgium) but more 
than Luxembourg, Spain or Portugal. Italy pursued a flexible approach, 
trying to bargain a better deal with respect to structural funds while fully 
endorsing closer monetary integration. Spain and Portugal joined the EC 
after the regional funds had been designed and monetary integration had 
been pursued for some time. They followed a multilateral approach to 
monetary integration. However, their economic preferences clearly differ 
too markedly from those of Germany to have followed its lead in monetary 
affairs (Royo 2006; Venegas 1997; Beggar thy neighbour 2008). Gaining 
financial power via a common currency must have outweighed the 
disadvantages of sacrificing competitive devaluation as a buffer against 
trade penetration. That hypothesis is confirmed by the low level of real 
interest rates in Spain feeding an enormous construction and real estate 
sector boom while aggravating trade deficits (Herr & Kazandziska 2007: ). 
The UK and the Nordic countries (except Finland) abstained from EMU. 
Again, this must be explained with (domestic) politics (widely neglected 
throughout this dissertation) and with respect to financial power. The 
Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian economic model differ markedly from 
each other and from the political economy of Continental Europe. Both 
regions were less affected by the devastations of WN II and had a strong 
tradition of regional autonomy. They soon displayed trade deficits due to 
higher price level as compared to the catching-up economies. The UK 
speculated on consolidating the role of sterling as the second most 
important reserve currency after WN II by heavily liberalising financial 
markets. Further, the UK's experience with regard to monetary solidarity in 
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to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty to safeguard their financial power. 
However, EU membership has put the Scandinavian approach to 
economic and welfare policies under pressure (Rojas 2005: 60-65). 
Sweden deliberately refused to join the euro by not abiding by the fiscal 
rules of the Maastricht Treaty and pursuing a rather interventionist policy 
(European Union 2009). The average growth performance of Britain and 
the respective Scandinavian countries compared to the EMU have so far 
justified their approach (Strassel 2009: 4). However, the current economic 
crisis and the gradual loss of sterling's status as international reserve 
currency have intensified the debate about Britain adopting the euro 
(Moore 2008). 
In sum, the concept of financial power coincides well with the national 
approaches to EMU. Countries with more financial power pursued 
monetary regionalism in order to defend existing trade patterns, whereas 
countries with little financial power tried to substitute limited national 
monetary sovereignty with increased regional monetary sovereignty. 
Financial power may not be isolated from the political agenda of national 
governments. An eclectic approach considering broader political goals is 
crucial to understanding national attitudes towards monetary regionalism. 
Certainly, national attitudes also depend on the ideological roots of 
political decision-makers. However, the German and French cases are 
telling: In 1999, then German Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine could not 
force through monetary multilateralism against the reservations of 
important domestic agents such as the Deutsche Bundesbank (see 
chapter 6.2). Conversely, France has lobbied for monetary regionalism 
even under conservative governments. Therefore, it is sensible to assume 
that the unequal distribution of financial power heavily conditions political 
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7. Conclusion 
Economic theories of regionalism have commonly neglected political 
factors such as cooperation in the security structure determining and 
enabling deeper regionalism. The dissertation has explained European 
integration within a framework of eclectic state-centric realism, assuming 
that nation states continue to define the character of regional integration. 
European integration has been a hegemonic project under unique 
historical circumstances: The US sponsored European regionalism in 
order to keep Western Europe in its sphere of influence during the Cold 
War. However, the cooperation of two Continental European hegemons, 
France and Germany, has been the driving force of deeper European 
integration. The military and economic setbacks to these countries from 
two World Wars have paved the way for closer integration. National 
bargains have conditioned the character of early European regionalism. 
Firmly grounded national attitudes continue to influence new regionalism 
and hence monetary integration. 
Financial power is defined as the potential to stimulate economic 
development through the provision of sufficient credit. It is conditioned by 
the domestic social contract (centralised wage bargaining) and the 
monetary or exchange rate regime. Relevant indicators of financial power 
are the status of a currency as international reserve medium, low inflation 
and hence a positive trade balance (with the exception of countries 
assuming a role as lender of last resort), as well as a huge internal market 
insulated from trade penetration. Financial power is unevenly distributed 
among nation states and their respective means of exchange. Hence, the 
dominant economic theories stipulating an equal distribution of financial 
power are rejected. The unholy trinity of monetary sovereignty, stable 
exchange rates, and openness to capital flows must be restated as unholy 
duality (unholy duality of capital liberalisation and monetary sovereignty). 
Nation states with little financial power trying to preserve or increase 
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The financial system of Bretton Woods has never been fully symmetric in 
design. Nevertheless, the dollar-gold standard of the Bretton Woods era 
has contributed to a more equitable distribution of financial power based 
on selective capital controls. However, the gradual relaxation of capital 
controls and the military undertakings of the United States in Korea und 
Vietnam have deepened the contradiction of financial leadership. The US 
dollar was caught between providing international liquidity and defending 
the gold parity. The Bretton Woods System collapsed when the US was no 
longer willing to subordinate domestic political concerns under global 
monetary stability. The abolition of the Bretton Woods financial system 
and the depreciation of the US dollar have spurred European monetary 
integration since nation states were under threat of declining financial 
power. 
However, the conflict between the monetary agenda of the regional 
financial leader Germany and countries with less financial power 
(economists versus monetarists) such as France has produced severe 
setbacks to European monetary integration. Monetary regionalism has 
been a tool for the rival agendas of increasing financial power and 
preserving unequal trade patterns. 
Germany had pronounced financial power. It therefore pursued an agenda 
rather hostile to symmetric monetary regionalism. Germany's approach to 
monetary integration had been conditioned by its desire to preserve 
unequal trade patterns. However, the country made concessions with 
respect to closer political integration. France has lobbied for a rather 
multilateral design of monetary integration based on its lesser financial 
power and the importance of its internal market. While the country has 
been sceptical of federalist governance (limiting the scope for 
intergovernmental and hegemonic bargains) it lobbied for 
intergovernmental economic governance (hedging Germany's mercantilist 
agenda). The Benelux countries have usually sponsored (monetary) 
regionalism based on their small financial power, high openness to trade 
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more financial power has followed the German lead in monetary affairs. 
The Southern Mediterranean countries have opted for closer political and 
monetary integration due to little financial and trading power. Italy has 
played an exceptional role, temporarily following the German lead in 
monetary affairs in order to bargain structural funds. The UK and the 
Nordic countries (except Finland) have developed a rather unilateral 
response to globalisation. They abstained from monetary union for 
domestic and historical reasons, since they had been less affected by 
World War II and therefore were less dependent upon political integration. 
Further, their abstention indicates that their political end economic 
systems (Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian capitalism) at the margins of the 
European political landscape could not be as easily reconciled with the 
Rhenisch capitalism dominating Continental Europe. 
The dominant concepts of monetary regionalism have changed over time. 
The conceptual shift from positive to negative integration reflects the 
evolution of relative power and intergovernmental bargains in Europe. The 
pressures for increased trade integration after the global monetarist 
recession of the post-Bretton Woods era and the end of the Cold War 
have transformed the character of European monetary regionalism in 
favour of Germany. An important turning point was the inability of the 
French government to pursue Keynesian economic policies in a non-
cooperative monetary environment against Germany. The Single 
European Act and the decision to liberalise capital flows have further 
increased pressures for monetary integration in order to contain political 
opposition to European economic integration. Germany's reunification and 
its consequent rise in political sovereignty have led its political elites to 
accede to a definitive monetary union. Hence, the dispute over 
regionalism being a response or a part of globalisation may be reconciled. 
The initial research question asked why EU members sacrificed their 
national monetary policies in favour of a common currency (euro) against 
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The dissertation established that for countries with little financial power 
monetary regionalism is a response to globalisation while Germany with 
huge financial power has pursued monetary union to preserve its trade 
patterns with EU member countries and consolidate its political 
sovereig nty. 
The current monetary union is at risk, since the German mercantilist 
agenda has pronounced unequal trade patterns. In the long run, Germany 
will have either to provide structural funds for countries with little financial 
power, or economic integration has to be further developed towards a truly 
European economic governance establishing mechanisms to reduce 
internal divergence within the currency area. Otherwise, the monetary 
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I. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
Absolute PPP states that market forces equalise purchasing power of 
different currencies for a basket of homogenous and tradable goods 
(assuming perfect information, no transportation costs, perfect 
competition, similar baskets of commodities, absence of barriers to trade 
and unrestricted capital flows). Relative PPP states that nominal exchange 
rate movements will adjust for differences in the real exchange rate (the 
purchasing power of a basket of goods in terms of another region's basket 
of goods) (Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 389-394). 
Example54 : A pair of identical and tradable shoes costs $20 in the US but only €10 in an 
EMU country. Then one US dollar ($) must buy half a euro (€) or one € buys two $ in 
order to equalise the price for a pair of shoes. If the exchange rate or the shoe price does 
not meet these criteria, arbitrage will occur. If one $ buys one € in that example, "hungry 
arbitrageurs" will buy shoes in Europe. They will thus increase the price of shoes in 
Europe and/or the demand for € (appreciation of € versus $) until purchasing power has 
equalised (one € buys two $). 
Absolute PPP can be expressed as: 
E$/€ = PUs/P E 
E denotes the exchange rate; P denotes the price level 
Relative PPP can be expressed as: 
(E$/€. t - E$/€.t_1)/E$/€.t_1 = 1tUs.t - 1tE,t 
t and t-1 denote a time frame in which a change occurs; 
1t denotes the rate of inflation 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 390-391) 
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II. Uncovered55 Interest Parity (UIP) 
UIP operates similarly (assuming perfect information, identical risk 
premium and openness to capital flows): It maintains that currency 
markets equilibrate when the expected returns on different currencies 
equalise (which eliminates incentives for arbitrage). The return on a 
currency is given by the nominal interest rate and the expected change in 
the exchange rate (Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 341-346). 
Example: $1 buys €1 but the nominal interest rate level is higher in the US than in the 
EMU area. According to IRP this can only be justified, if the interest rate differential 
equals the expected change in the exchange rate (the US-$ is expected to depreciate). 
From a standpoint of intuition one might expect that shifting funds into $ might be more 
attractive. However, according to the model, rational investors expect a certain future 
exchange rate which will eliminate incentives for arbitrage. Hence, if investors were to 
shift their funds into $, raising its value in relation to the € in the short-term, the $ is 
expected to depreciate even more in the future (E is expected to rise, see below). 
The relationship can be expressed as 
R denotes the interest rate on a deposit; Ee denotes the expected change in the 
exchange rate 
(Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: 342) 
55 Covered interest rate parity involving forward exchange rates (defined via contract) 
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III. Balassa-Samuelson-Effect 
The baskets of commodities of two national economies consist of 50 per 
cent tradable and non-tradable goods and services (which is a good 
approximation for very small open economies). 
Example: The domestic economy grows by 4 per cent. The productivity in the tradable 
sector rises by 8 per cent while productivity does not rise in the non-tradable sector. 
Hence, the average increase in productivity for the whole economy is 4 per cent. If 
according to the law of one price or mobility of workers wages rise by 8 per cent in both 
sectors, the overall price level will rise by 4 per cent. 
In the foreign economy the productivity increases by 4 per cent in the tradable sector and 
does not rise at all in the non-tradable sector. Again, an increase in wages by 4 per cent 
will increase the overall price level by 2 per cent. 
According to PPP, the currency of the domestic economy must depreciate 
by 2 per cent in the previous example to offset the changes in the price 
level. However, the competitive situation between the economies' tradable 
sectors remained exactly the same as wages in that sector reflect the 
increase in productivity. 
We can reconsider the example by assuming that wages did follow 
average productivity. In this case the prices of tradables could be lowered 
by 4 per cent in the domestic economy and by only 2 per cent in the 
foreign economy. Now the domestic economy certainly enjoys an 
advantage. However, if the exchange rate eliminates this advantage, it 
also eliminates the incentive for innovation within and across economies. 
The nominal exchange rate works like a tax on extra profits accumulated 
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IV. Currency Board 
The exchange rate between the domestic currency and the foreign anchor currency is 
fixed. 
Every market participant has the right to exchange domestic currency of any quantity and 
at any time into the anchor currency. 
The anchor currency must be held at a sufficient level (usually up to 110 per cent of the 
domestic monetary base). 
A currency board requires a strong political consensus (sometimes even a constitutional 
clause) about the system in order to guarantee its credibility. 
A currency board has no powers to effect monetary policy and does not lend to the 
government. 
A currency board does not act as a lender of last resort to commercial banks, and does 
not regulate reserve requirements. 
A currency board does not manipulate interest rates via a repo rate like a central bank. 
The peg with the foreign currency keeps interest rates and inflation closely aligned to 
those in the country against whose currency the peg is fixed. 
(Hanke 2002: 203-222) 
V. Bimetallism 
Bimetallism created incentives for arbitrage: 
Example: If the mint stood at 15 Y, to 1 (as in France in 1803), the mint supplied coins of 
equal value containing a certain amount of gold or 15 Y, times as much silver. When the 
mint ratio rose to 16, traders could import 15 Y, ounces of silver and receive one ounce of 
gold. One ounce of gold sold for 16 ounces of silver on the world markets, thereby 
securing the arbitrageur an extra half ounce of silver (Eichengreen 1996: 10-11). This 











Financial Power & Monetary Regionalism 
VI. The Keynes Plan for an International Currency Union 
John Maynard Keynes lobbied for international money. He envisaged an 
accounting currency (bancor) administered by an International Clearing 
Union (ICU), against which credit and liabilities would be held. National 
central banks would keep accounts with the ICU "through which they 
would be entitled to settle their exchange balance with one another at their 
par value as defined in bancor" (Horsefield 1969: 3) Countries would not 
hold liabilities against each other but against the currency union as a 
whole. Keynes, who had warned that the burden of German reparations 
after World War I would have negative repercussions on other European 
economies, saw bilateral liabilities as a source of political conflict and war 
(Keynes 1929: 1-7). Hence, deposits at the ICU would be used to lend 
money to deficit countries, circumventing deflation as an adjustment 
mechanism. The penalties or quotas applied to excessive creditor and 
debtor countries and provisions for trade sanctions or currency 
realignments should have ensured a multilateral approach to balance of 
payment adjustment. In sum, Keynes did not want to sacrifice the 
domestic interest rate policy for ensuring external balance (Muchlinski 
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VII. The disintegration of the gold standard 
Gold had mostly vanished from circulation during World War I, since 
governments had concentrated it in their central banks' vaults. In order to 
stretch the scarce supply of gold which limited monetary expansion, 
foreign exchange had been included in central banks' reserves as a gold 
substitute. If all countries had agreed to hold a portion of foreign exchange 
in their portfolios, they would have relaxed the limitations of gold on the 
money supply. However, in the absence of collective coordination, 
countries that relaxed the gold constraint could fall prey to speculators. 
British interests to halt a further decline in prices (which complicated 
restoring sterling's pre-war parity) and the role of the City as international 
harbour for foreign exchange facilitated an international agreement. 
However, the US had enjoyed a considerable rise in its gold reserves and 
opposed such plans (Eichengreen 1996: 61). 
The Great Depression first reached the periphery and then spread to the 
industrial core. Austria and Germany experienced huge banking crises 
that in turn infected Britain. Britain's financial system had looser ties to the 
industrial sector than was the case in Continental Europe, but the credit 
crunch spread through the banking system. Mercantilist responses to the 
crisis further hurt British income from interest, foreign investment, shipping 
and insurance56. As a result three dominant blocks emerged: A gold-
standard block led by the United States, the sterling area where many 
British trading partners pegged to the sterling, and the Central and Eastern 
European countries, led by Germany, which imposed exchange controls 
(Eichengreen 1996: 49; 81). 
56 The popular British scepticism towards European monetary integration has its historical 
roots in the events of that time. British merchant banks had considerable claims against 
central European banks. The largest Austrian Bank (Wiener Kreditanstalt) collapsed and 
caused a run on the deposits in central Europe. Central European governments then 
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VIII. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 
SDRs entitle the respective country unconditionally to obtain a certain amount of 
widely accepted currencies (in proportion to its IMF quota). Currently, SDRs are 
composed of US dollars, the euro, pound sterling and the Japanese yen. Before 
the introduction of the euro SDRs included the French franc and the German 
Deutsche mark. However, SDRs became meaningless under freely floating 
exchange rates (International Monetary Fund 2009). 
Some major industrial countries were increasingly concerned about a 
possible shortage of liquidity to finance their payment balances if the US 
deficit should ever disappear (BMF 1977: 22). The volume of global trade 
had risen significantly compared to the level when the Bretton Woods 
agreement had been concluded. This motivated the Group of Ten (G 10) 
to increase quotas and allocate resources to a small number of industrial 
economies responsible to extend credit on conditional terms. 
However, developing countries objected to the exclusive approach 
stressing their greater financing needs (Eichengreen 1996: 118). The 
controversy was even harder to solve among industrial countries with 
different degrees of financial power. Weak currency countries favoured 
additional finance and provoked opposition from strong currency countries 
such as Germany (BMF 1977: 26; Eichengreen 1996: 119). In 1965 the 
US reversed its stance and agreed to create SDRs. The London-based 
market premium on gold indicated that the financial position of the dollar 
was not sacrosanct and France otherwise threatened to liquidate its dollar 
reserves. However, France had been successful lobbying for a provision 
that SDRs would only be enacted if the adjustment mechanism had been 
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IX. The real asymmetry of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
Example: If the French franc came under attack and reached its intervention point, 
the Banque de France (BDF) either had to use its own reserves to buy the franc by 
supplying Deutsche marks to the market or to utilise the credit lines from the VSTF. 
The credit facility of the ERM was unlimited in the short-term. However, 
subsequently the credit had to be repaid by the central bank in assets other than its 
own currency, imposing a budget constraint on France. Consequently, the BDF 
could either raise interest rates to follow the restrictive monetary policy of its 
counterpart or it had to devalue the franc. The effects on the monetary policy of 
Germany on the other hand have to be divided into the implications for its reserves 
and the liquidity of its domestic banking system: The Bundesbank simultaneously 
had to buy French assets and supply Deutsche marks to the market. It immediately 
transferred them to the BDF where they were denominated in ECU. However, the 
French VSTF account was debited and Germany was accordingly credited, again 
requiring France to adjust its policy to avoid insolvency. However, the liquidity 
effect on Germany's domestic banking system could be easily neutralised by the 
Bundesbank. 
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X. List of abbreviations and acronyms 
BDF 
Banque de France 
Benelux 
Group of Western European states comprising Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxemburg 
BMF 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (German Ministry of Finance) 
BOE 
Bank of England 
CEEC 
Committee for European Economic Cooperation 
COMECON 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
ECA 
Economic Cooperation Administration 
ECB 
European Central Bank 
ECE 
Economic Commission for Europe 
EEC 















European Coal and Steel Community (Montan Union) 
ECU 
European Currency Unit 
EFTA 
European Free Trade Area 
EMA 
European Monetary Agreement 
EMCF 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
EMI 
European Monetary Institute 
EMS 
European Monetary System 
EMU 
European Monetary Union 
EPC 
European Political Community 
ERM 
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EPU 




European Atomic Energy Community 
FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment 
FED 
Federal Reserve Bank 
FTA 
Free Trade Area 
GATT 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GOP 
Gross Domestic Product 
GDR 
German Democratic Republic 
leu 
International Clearing Union 
IMF 
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ITO 
International Trade Organisation 
NAFTA 
North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
OECD 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEEC 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
OCA 
Optimum Currency Area 
OMO 
Open Market Operation 
OPEC 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PPP 
Purchasing Power Parity 
SEA 
Single European Act 
SDR 
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TEG 
Treaty establishing a European Constitution 
UIP 






United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
US 
United States of America 
USSR 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VSTF 
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